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ABSTRACT 
Two Essays on the Value of Cash. (August 2012) 
Timothy Kyle Tippens, B.A., Abilene Christian University; 
M.I.B.S., University of South Carolina 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Shane A. Johnson 
In the first essay, “The Source of Cash and Its Marginal Value,” we study the 
relation between the source of firms’ cash holdings and the value of the cash to 
shareholders. The marginal value of a dollar of cash holdings depends on the source of 
the dollar:  $1.00 of cash has a value of $1.27 when it is from operations, $0.80 when 
from financing, and $0.46 when from investing. Within the same source, the marginal 
value of an added dollar of cash holdings is significantly higher than the absolute value 
of a subtracted dollar. Shareholders of financially constrained or distressed firms value 
incremental cash holdings from almost any source more highly than do shareholders of 
unconstrained or stronger firms, but differences in value remain across the sources of 
cash within each subsample. Agency costs and information asymmetry are two frictions 
that appear to have the largest impact upon the value of cash. 
In the second essay, “Explanations for Diverging Values of Cash,” we further 
explain the differing values of cash found in the first essay. Intertemporal relationships 
among the sources and uses of cash provide a rational basis for shareholders to assign 
different values of cash based on the source. Sources of cash provide information about 
likely uses of cash up to two to three years in the future, and many of the intertemporal 
 iv 
relations are statistically and economically significant. Likewise, prior uses of cash relate 
significantly to later uses of cash. Past sources of cash inform investors about likely 
future sources, even up to five years into the future. The fact that different kinds of cash 
flows have predictive power for future cash flows helps explain the wide range of the 
values of cash associated with different sources. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is comprised of two essays, presented in Section 2 and Section 
3. Section 2 is related to work by Galpin, Johnson, and Tippens (2011). 
In the first essay, “The Source of Cash and Its Marginal Value,” we ask whether 
the source of cash has any effect on its marginal value. Since cash is recorded in the 
statement of cash flows net of any direct frictions, one could argue that cash should have 
the same value to investors, no matter the source. Assuming a world without frictions, 
we hypothesize that cash could have different values to investors, depending on where 
the cash originated. We next consider three different scenarios in which three different 
frictions are introduced, and we make semi-quantitative predictions about the value of 
cash to investors under each scenario. 
We attempt to answer four questions in the first essay. First, does the marginal 
value of cash differ based on its source? Second, are cash values symmetric for cash 
increases and decreases? Third, do the marginal values of different sources of cash and 
does the symmetry of the value of cash increases and decreases vary depending on a 
firm’s financial constraints or its degree of financial distress? Fourth, which frictions 
appear to be the most significant ones affecting marginal values of cash? 
Using a sample of more than 78,000 firm-year observations from 1987 to 2011, 
our results demonstrate that there are indeed significant differences in the marginal value 
of cash that relate to its source. We find that cash increases tend to be valued more  
 
_______________ 
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Finance. 
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highly than corresponding cash decreases. Financial constraints and distress both tend to 
cause the slope of the relation between changes in cash from all sources and firm value 
to be steeper. The asymmetry in the value of cash for increases and decreases is similar 
for all firms. Agency costs and information asymmetry appear to be the most influential 
frictions that affect the values of cash. Financially constrained and distressed firms are 
more acutely affected by these frictions. Even though we are able to answer several 
questions in the essay, the results generate even more questions. One of those is why 
cash is valued so differently depending on its source. 
In the second essay, “Explanations for Diverging Values of Cash,” we delve 
deeper into this question of why cash can have such different values. Extant research has 
shown that the likely use of cash affects its marginal value. We connect the likely use of 
cash in the future to the earlier source of the cash, providing a rationale for why 
investors would look to the source of the cash to assign a marginal value to it. The 
eventual use of cash is linked to sources of cash up to two or three years prior to its use. 
In a similar way, prior uses of cash are linked to future uses of cash. Once the firm 
chooses to use cash for something, investors are provided with information about 
possible future uses as well. Finally, prior sources of cash are connected with future 
sources of cash in statistically and economically meaningful ways. All of these 
intertemporal linkages help us understand why there can be such divergence in the value 
of cash across different sources. 
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2. THE SOURCE OF CASH AND ITS MARGINAL VALUE 
2.1 Introduction to Section 2 
Extant research shows that the likely use of cash by a firm affects shareholders’ 
valuation of the firm’s cash holdings.1 Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that the 
marginal value of cash holdings varies with a firm’s cash levels, leverage, the method of 
payout, and the degree of financial constraints the firm faces. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
(2007) find that poorly governed firms use excess cash in performance-reducing ways 
and that shareholders consequently attach much lower value to cash holdings in these 
firms.  
We investigate whether the source of a dollar of cash holdings matters in its 
valuation. Statements of cash flows divide the sources of changes in cash holdings into 
those arising from operating, financing, and investing (or divesting) actions. The costs 
involved in generating an incremental dollar of cash holdings may vary across these 
sources. For example, the pecking order hypothesis suggests that managers prefer to use 
internally generated funds from operating activities, thereby avoiding the higher costs 
associated with financing actions such as equity offerings. Even so, a dollar change in 
cash holdings is recorded net of all direct frictions. Thus, it is straightforward to argue 
that the source should not matter when estimating the value of a dollar of cash holdings 
because we observe the dollar net of any frictions that affected it. On the other hand, one 
                                                 
1
 I would like to thank seminar participants at Abilene Christian University, Baylor University 
(Hankamer), Kansas State University, Pepperdine University (Graziadio), and the University of Alabama 
in Huntsville for their helpful comments on early drafts of this essay. Any remaining errors are those of 
the author alone. 
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can argue that changes in cash holdings from various sources should have varying 
information content or indirect frictions that investors incorporate into the value they 
assign to cash holdings. Thus, whether the sources of changes in cash holdings matter is 
an empirical question. 
We contribute to the research on the value of cash holdings by examining four 
main questions:  First, does the marginal value of changes in firms’ cash holdings 
depend on the source of those changes? Second, are the values of firms’ cash holdings 
symmetric for cash increases and decreases? Third, do the marginal values of different 
cash sources and does the value symmetry of cash increases and decreases vary 
depending on a firm’s financial constraints or level of financial distress? Finally, which 
frictions appear to have the most impact on marginal values of cash? 
 Ceteris paribus, a firm’s cash holdings will increase when operating cash flows, 
financing cash flows, and/or investing cash flows are positive. Conversely, negative 
operating cash flows, cash distributions to security holders, and/or investing activities 
will lead to decreases in a firm’s cash holdings. In the data, the ceteris paribus condition 
is nontrivial because the various sources and uses of cash often work in offsetting 
directions. For example, one might expect that operating cash flows are the largest driver 
of changes in a firm’s cash holdings from one period to the next, and that cash holdings 
would typically rise when operating cash flows are positive. Empirically, however, 
during firm-years with positive operating cash flows, cash holdings still decline 44% of 
the time. Even during firm-years with both positive operating and financing cash flows, 
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cash holdings fall 38% of the time due to investing activities. These simple statistics 
illustrate the variation in the underlying sources of changes in firms’ cash holdings.  
Using a sample of more than 78,000 firm-year observations from 1987 to 2011 
and following the approach in Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007), we find that the marginal value to shareholders of an incremental dollar of 
cash holdings varies depending on the source of the dollar:  $1.00 of incremental cash 
holdings has a marginal value of $1.27 when it is from operating activities, but only 
$0.80 when from financing activities and $0.46 when from investing activities (each of 
these values differs significantly from the others). Thus, the marginal values of firms’ 
cash holdings depend on the origin of the changes in cash holdings. The sources differ 
on dimensions such as information asymmetry, potential agency problems, taxes, 
transaction costs, and investment adjustment costs. The results imply that these factors 
influence the value of firms’ cash holdings, and we seek to identify which factors affect 
valuations the most. 
We also examine whether the marginal values of changes in firms’ cash holdings 
are symmetric for increases and decreases in cash holdings. While an incremental dollar 
of cash is valued unconditionally at $1.12 in the sample, a one dollar net increase in cash 
holdings leads to a $1.32 value increase whereas a one dollar net decrease in cash 
holdings leads to a reduction in value of only $0.41. Consider investing cash flows. If 
firms invest and divest optimally, then both investment (cash outflows) and divestment 
(cash inflows) will either have no impact on firm value or increase firm value. We find 
that a dollar of cash invested reduces firm value by $0.39, suggesting that firms do not 
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benefit from investment on average. Upon divesting, a dollar of cash added to the 
balance sheet increases firm value by $0.68. The increase and the decrease in cash 
holdings associated with these two investing activities are valued significantly 
differently from each other. 
If firms finance optimally, then at least in a frictionless world, both increases and 
decreases in cash associated with financing activities should not affect firm value per 
share. We find not only that these financing activities affect firm value, implying the 
presence of frictions, but also that increases and decreases in cash holdings are valued 
differently. A new dollar of debt adds $0.56 in value, while a one dollar reduction in 
debt decreases value by $0.45 (the values differ significantly from each other). A new 
dollar of equity adds $1.25 in value, while a dollar of equity payout reduces value by 
$0.21 (statistically, the number is insignificantly different from zero). Even operating 
cash flows show differential values based on whether cash is added to or subtracted from 
the firm. One dollar from operations is worth $1.40, suggesting that changes in cash 
from operating activities are viewed as more than simple one-time cash flows. One 
dollar lost from operating activities reduces firm value by only $0.10, an amount not 
statistically distinguishable from zero. 
 Addressing our third question, the value of each source of cash is generally 
higher for financially weaker or constrained firms than for stronger or less constrained 
firms. In particular, shareholders of financially weaker or constrained firms attach 
significantly greater value to an incremental dollar of cash from financing or divesting 
activities than do shareholders of stronger or unconstrained firms. Shareholders of 
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financially constrained firms value cash from operating activities more highly than do 
shareholders of unconstrained firms. Interestingly, the differences in the values of 
changes in cash holdings also exist for cash decreases as well. A dollar decrease in cash 
holdings has a greater impact on value for a financially weaker or constrained firm than 
for a stronger or unconstrained firm. The greater value impact for decreases in cash 
holdings means that firm value declines more for a given decrease in cash holdings. 
Within each subsample of firms, whether constrained or unconstrained, distressed or 
strong, the asymmetry in the value of cash between increases and decreases still holds in 
almost all cases. An increase in cash raises firm value more than a corresponding 
decrease in cash lowers firm value. 
To address our final question, we first predict how the source of cash could affect 
its value even in a frictionless environment. Then, taking three frictions in turn, we make 
semi-quantitative predictions about how each friction would affect the value of cash 
from various sources. Comparing the empirical results to the predictions, we find only 
two results that are in line with a frictionless model. In most cases, agency costs and/or 
information asymmetry appear to have the greatest impact on marginal values of cash. 
Moreover, these frictions appear to afflict distressed or financially constrained firms 
even more than they affect other firms. Taxes, adjustment or transaction costs, or other 
factors may not be first-order concerns in causing differences in the value of cash, but in 
Section 3 we study in more detail how differing information content could help explain 
some of the differences. 
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In sum, by using models that allow the estimations of the value of cash to differ 
depending on its source, we are able to uncover new results that shed light on the nature 
of the frictions that different kinds of firms face. We also learn more about the value that 
shareholders place on various actions of the firm. The results also raise new questions. 
Why is cash valued so differently depending on its source? Why is investing so often 
associated with a decrease in firm value? Why is cash stemming from positive net 
operating cash flows or equity issues valued so highly? 
We contribute to understanding the value of cash holdings by exploiting the large 
variation evident in the sources of changes in firms’ cash holdings.2 Our results show 
that the valuation of cash holdings is substantially more complex than is detected when 
using aggregated measures of changes in cash holdings. Our work also contributes to the 
literatures on investing and divesting activities and financing and payout activities. Our 
work is also related to efforts in the accounting literature to decompose earnings and 
cash flows (see Lipe (1986), Livnat and Zarowin (1990), and Barth, Cram, and Nelson 
(2001)). 
2.2 Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 No Frictions 
 Ceteris paribus and given perfect markets, firms that experience an increase in 
cash holdings (without a corresponding decline in another asset account or a 
                                                 
2
 In addition to Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), an incomplete list of 
other recent work in this area includes Gamba and Triantis (2008), Kalcheva and Lins (2007), Klasa, 
Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009), Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2006), and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004). 
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corresponding increase in a liability account) should see their equity value rise by the 
amount of the cash increase. In such an environment, an increase in cash holdings would 
not provide any information content to investors, and there would be no agency costs or 
taxes to keep shareholders from benefiting fully from the increase in cash holdings. 
Regardless of the channel through which an increase in cash holdings came, as long as 
other accounts were not changed the increase would affect equity value the same way. 
 Yet many sources and uses of cash are tied to changes in other asset or liability 
accounts. For example, an additional dollar on the balance sheet that comes from issuing 
debt is associated with an increase in a liability account. Taking these mechanical 
relationships into account, while still ignoring the impact of frictions and assuming that 
firms act optimally, we can predict how changes in cash holdings derived from various 
activities will affect firm value. The effects of a change in cash on firm value may now 
differ depending on the channel. 
If firms increase their cash holdings $1.00 because of operating activities, we 
would expect firm value to increase by about $1.00, as predicted earlier, since there is no 
corresponding change to any asset or liability account. With regard to investing 
activities, a firm would only invest another dollar in its capital stock (property, plant, 
equipment, or an acquisition) if the ex ante market value of that capital increase would 
be at least a dollar. (Otherwise, it would be optimal for the firm to continue to hold the 
dollar in cash and invest nothing.) This would mean that in the worst case, investing 
would not change firm value at all, but investing could actually increase firm value. 
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Likewise, a firm would disinvest
3
 $1.00 of its assets in place only if the value of the 
asset to the firm is less than or equal to its outside value of $1.00. Similar to investing, 
disinvesting should have no effect on firm value in the worst case, and it should increase 
firm value in some cases. 
For financing activities, when viewed from the perspective of market value per 
share, the results do not depend on whether funds are raised or paid out, or whether the 
financing is debt or equity.
4
 In all cases, the expected impact on market equity (per 
share) is zero. This prediction follows from Modigliani and Miller (1958). New debt 
resulting in a cash increase is matched by a corresponding liability. From the perspective 
of the shareholder, there is no net effect on firm value. When debt is retired, the 
corresponding liability is extinguished as cash is paid out and thus shareholders see no 
impact on firm value then either. Ignoring signaling effects and still assuming optimal 
firm behavior, issuing equity simply raises the number of shares outstanding but has no 
effect on share prices. When shares are repurchased, the opposite effect occurs: the 
number of shares outstanding falls but there is no impact on share prices. When 
dividends are paid out, the share price falls by the amount of the dividend on the ex-
dividend date, but the dividend return per share makes up the exact difference. Therefore 
there is still no impact to shareholders. The predictions for all of these changes in firm 
                                                 
3
 In this dissertation, the terms “divest” and “disinvest” are used interchangeably. The terms are used to 
describe the action in which a firm disposes of assets in place. 
4
 We frame the question in terms of the effects upon market value per share because that is the standard 
way to approach the question empirically in this line of literature (using stock returns to estimate the 
marginal value of cash). In untabulated results, we run some of our tests using changes in total market 
equity as the dependent variable and find some different coefficients, most notably for the equity issuance 
and equity payout variables as expected. 
 11 
value, expressed in terms of partial derivatives of market equity value per share, are 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
 
Table 2.1 
Semi-quantitative Predictions: Marginal Values of Cash in an Environment 
without Frictions. 
ME is market equity, Dis is the cash paid to the firm upon disinvesting, V(Dis) is the market value (to the firm’s 
shareholders) of the firm’s assets disinvested in the amount of Dis, Inv is the cost of an investment, V(Inv) is the 
market value (to the firm’s shareholders) of the firm’s investment with a cost of Inv. All variables are expressed in 
terms of “per share” values. To aid later interpretation of coefficients, partial derivatives of firm value with respect to 
cash used to invest and to pay out are also calculated from the perspective of the amount of investment and payout, 
respectively, i.e., these partial derivatives are calculated with respect to the absolute value of the change in cash. 
   
Sources of Cash:  
 Operating cash flow ∂ME/∂Cash ≈ 1 
 Disinvesting V(Dis) ≤ Dis 
 
∂ME/∂Cash = (Dis-V(Dis))/Dis ≥ 0 
 Issuing debt or equity ∂ME/∂Cash ≈ 0 
Uses of Cash:  
 Investing V(Inv) ≥ Inv 
 
∂ME/∂Cash = (V(Inv)-Inv)/(-Inv) ≤ 0 
 
Partial derivative with respect to investment instead of cash: 
∂ME/∂Investment = (V(Inv)-Inv)/(Inv) ≥ 0 
 Retiring debt, or equity 
dividends/repurchases 
∂ME/∂Cash ≈ 0 
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2.2.2 Financial Constraints and Financial Distress 
 When firms are unable to raise external financing freely to whatever level is 
optimal for the firm, the firm cannot implement its first-best investment plan. Multiple 
factors may prevent the firm from fully accessing the capital markets, some of which 
may be beyond the firm’s control. One factor may be asymmetric information: capital 
providers may feel that they do not have as much information about the firm and its 
prospects as the managers have. A related issue could be that of agency costs: capital 
providers may be concerned that managers will not represent their best interests in 
managing the firm. There may be other causes as well, but the end result is that 
shareholders may value the constrained firm’s actions in a different way than they would 
those of a relatively unconstrained firm. This may translate into different marginal 
values of cash for financially constrained as opposed to relatively unconstrained firms. 
In a similar way, firms that have experienced difficulty in achieving or sustaining 
profitability may find their opportunity set shrinking. To the extent that these firms have 
existing debt or require debt in the future to fund their operations, they could be 
experiencing financial distress. Even all-equity firms are unable to operate indefinitely at 
a loss; such unprofitable firms could be considered financially troubled. Although the 
possible causes for financial distress or trouble are many, some of the frictions identified 
earlier can aggravate the situation. For example, managers of firms in distress may 
become more concerned about the impact of looming insolvency on their own careers. 
Even if agency costs had not been a problem before, the challenging environment may 
cause managers to fail to place the shareholders’ interests above their own in managing 
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the firm. As with financially constrained firms, shareholders may assign different 
marginal values of cash in distressed or troubled firms than they would in stronger firms. 
We seek to understand whether these differences are significant, and we also want to 
understand which frictions appear to be most relevant in constrained or distressed firms. 
2.2.3 Three Hypothetical Scenarios with Distinct Frictions 
We next consider the impact that specific frictions might have on firms’ marginal 
values of cash. Specifically we isolate three different hypothetical scenarios in which a 
particular class of friction is the only significant one affecting the value of cash. The 
three classes of frictions are taxes, agency problems, and information asymmetry. These 
frictions are some of the most significant ones studied by researchers in finance.
5
 
Under the Taxes Only scenario, taxes on dividends and capital gains keep 
shareholders from receiving the full amount of the firm’s distributions. Therefore, cash 
from internal sources (operating and divesting) has lower values than under the 
frictionless scenario, and the values differ from the frictionless scenario by the amount 
of investors’ dividend or capital gains marginal tax rates. The firm still issues and 
retires/repurchases debt and equity as in the optimal scenario, and these actions do not 
affect the value of the shares. Finally, to the extent that the firm makes investments in 
positive NPV projects that increase share value, the magnitudes of these increases are 
also muted by the amount of investors’ marginal tax rates.  
                                                 
5
 For an example of each of these, see Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007), Jensen (1986), and 
Myers and Majluf (1984), who focus on taxes, agency costs, and information asymmetry respectively. 
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With the Agency Only scenario, managers cannot be trusted to work in the 
interests of shareholders at all times. This causes cash sourced from operating activities 
to be worth less than it would be otherwise. The effect of divesting activities upon firm 
value is ambiguous: if the benefits to divesting are great enough or if the agency costs 
are low enough, divesting may increase firm value. However, in an environment fraught 
with agency conflicts, managers may divest assets for reasons that have little to do with 
maximizing shareholder value (see, for example, Bartov (1993)). In these cases, 
divesting may decrease firm value. With regard to financing, cash from debt issues may 
increase firm value. This is because of the potential screening and monitoring benefit 
provided by debtholders (see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Grossman and Hart (1982), 
and Jensen (1986) for early work in this area). Without screening and monitoring, debt 
issues have no impact on firm value. When the firm issues new equity, investors who 
participate are aware of the agency problems and still provide funds to the company. 
Therefore it is possible that investors who already own shares may find that their shares 
are worth more than they had previously thought. 
The uses of cash under the Agency Only scenario differ from both of the other 
scenarios considered so far. When the firm invests, investors are concerned that some 
portion of the investments are undertaken for the wrong reasons, i.e., to provide private 
benefits for management. Thus at best, investing results in no change in firm value. At 
worst, investments destroy firm value. Debt retirements may also be viewed negatively: 
shareholders may view the retirement of debt as the loss of a monitoring benefit. If 
debtholders had not monitored the firm, however, then debt retirements do not affect 
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firm value. Finally, equity payouts demonstrate the willingness of management to 
relinquish control of some assets and pay them out to shareholders instead of using them 
for private benefits. This may cause investors to revise upward their estimated likelihood 
of receiving future distributions from the firm. Therefore firm value may increase. 
Finally, under the Information Only scenario, information asymmetry plagues 
shareholders. Management knows the true prospects of the firm before investors do, and 
shareholders interpret management’s actions and the firm’s results as signals about the 
firm’s true prospects. Only under this scenario is a dollar of cash stemming from 
operating activities valued above $1.00. A dollar of internally generated operating cash 
flow keeps the firm from having to raise funds from other sources, and it may also 
provide news about the firm’s future prospects. Divesting may raise or lower firm value. 
Divesting could mean that the firm’s assets in place are not valued as highly as investors 
previously thought (a bad signal), but divesting could also mean that management is 
maximizing shareholder value appropriately. Debt issues also have an ambiguous effect 
on firm value. On one hand, the fact that management prefers debt over equity may 
imply that they feel that the firm’s equity is underpriced (a good sign). On the other 
hand, the fact that the firm needs to raise cash via a debt issue may imply that operating 
cash flows were lower than expected, and the firm has to raise debt in order to continue 
operations. Equity issues could be a bad sign for investors, as it may mean that 
management believes the firm’s shares are overvalued (as in Myers and Majluf (1984)). 
Under the Information Only scenario, there is no clear prediction for the impact 
of investing on the value of cash. Investing could signal good prospects for the firm and 
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a high productivity of assets, but especially in the case of acquisitions, investing activity 
could signal that assets in place are not productive enough. The retirement of debt has 
little effect on firm value in this scenario. Finally, equity payouts also do not have a clear 
prediction. Equity payouts convey the positive news that management is confident 
enough in the firm’s prospects to return cash to investors (Easterbrook (1984)), but 
equity payouts may also convey the negative news that growth opportunities have 
diminished, triggering a distribution to shareholders by management. The predictions for 
the value of cash under each scenario for each type of cash source and use are 
summarized in Table 2.2. 
We use these predictions to guide our tests. With our first test we seek to 
determine whether or not the various sources of cash do, in fact, have different marginal 
values. In a frictionless world, most coefficients should be close to or identical to zero, 
except for the coefficient on operating cash flow. With frictions, there will be more 
differences. Next, we consider whether the marginal values of cash increases are valued 
equivalently to cash decreases. We then study the impact of financial distress and 
financial constraints upon the marginal value of cash to see whether these special types 
of firms are viewed differently by shareholders. Finally, we hypothesize that each of the 
frictions previously discussed may play a role in affecting the marginal value of cash, 
and we seek to identify which frictions have the most impact by studying the values of 
cash within and between subsamples.   
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Table 2.2 
Semi-quantitative Predictions: Partial Derivatives of Market Equity in 
Environments of Various Frictions. 
The table provides the predictions for the partial derivative of market equity with respect to cash (for sources of cash). 
The predictions are expressed with respect to investing dollars for Investing (*); with respect to debt retirement dollars 
for Debt Retirement (†); and with respect to equity payout dollars for Equity Payout (‡). τ is the marginal tax rate for 
dividends or capital gains for the marginal investor. 
 
 
2.3 Methods 
Studies of the value of firms’ cash holdings generally have focused on the change 
in cash holdings (and short-term investments) from one period to the next. We examine 
questions about possible differences in cash valuation across sources of the changes in 
cash holdings; therefore we decompose the change in cash to differentiate among 
potential sources of cash. A simple decomposition derived from the statement of cash 
flows is the following:  
 
, , ,
,
    
  ,
i t i t i t
i t
C CF fromOperating CF from Investing
CF from Financing
   
 (2.1) 
No 
Frictions Taxes Only Agency Only
Information 
Only
Sources of Cash
Operating 1 <1 (N.F.*(1-τ)) <1 ≥1
Divesting ≥0 ≥0 (N.F.*(1-τ)) ? ?
Debt Issue 0 0 ≥0 ?
Equity Issue 0 0 ≥0 <0
Uses of Cash
Investing* ≥0 ≥0 (N.F.*(1-τ)) ≤0 ?
Debt Retirement† 0 0 ≤0 0
Equity Payout‡ 0 0 ≥0 ?
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where ∆Ci,t = Cashi,t – Cashi,t-1 and the variables on the right side of the equation are the 
three key parts of the statement of cash flows. In most of this section, we make further 
distinctions by splitting net operating cash flows into negative and positive realizations 
and by breaking cash flows from investing and financing activities into their positive and 
negative components available in Compustat.
6
 Financing cash flows are further divided 
into debt and equity components. Our primary decomposition of the change in cash is 
the following: 
 
, , [ 0] , [ 0] , ,
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        
   
 (2.2) 
where OpCFi,t  is net cash flow from operating activities, 1[∙] is the indicator function, 
Investi,t is the sum of capital expenditures and acquisitions, Divesti,t is the proceeds from 
the sale of property, plant, and equipment, DebtIssuei,t is the proceeds from the issuance 
of long-term debt, DebtRetirei,t is the reduction of long-term debt, EqIssuei,t is the 
proceeds from the issuance of stock, EqPayouti,t is the sum of stock repurchases and 
cash dividends, and FinOtheri,t is the sum of other financing items that change cash 
balances. 
 We follow the methods of Faulkender and Wang (2006) to estimate the value of 
cash to shareholders. In a process similar to a long-term event study, they regress annual 
risk-adjusted returns on unexpected annual changes in cash and a number of control 
                                                 
6
 One could break operating cash flow into its gross positive and negative components also, but unlike 
investing and financing cash flows, some of the components of operating cash flow are non-cash accruals 
that are used to adjust accounting earnings to a cash flow figure. Therefore we simply allow the 
coefficients on negative and positive realizations of net operating cash flow to differ. 
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variables. All explanatory variables (except for market leverage) are scaled by lagged 
market equity. This allows the estimated coefficient of the unexpected cash change 
variable to have a useful interpretation: it represents the market valuation of a marginal 
dollar of cash held by the firm. 
In this dissertation, we break the “change in cash” variable into the nine 
components identified in equation (2.2). We focus on the estimated coefficients of these 
cash flow components. These coefficients can be interpreted as the market valuation of a 
marginal dollar of cash holdings originating from that specific cash flow. Faulkender and 
Wang emphasize the idea that they want to use unexpected changes in cash as their key 
measure, as opposed to simple period-to-period changes, since any expected changes in 
cash would already be incorporated into stock prices at the beginning of the period. After 
constructing three different proxies for the unexpected changes in cash, they find no 
significant differences between using these proxies and the simple period-to-period 
difference in the cash balance. Therefore they use the simpler measure throughout their 
paper. Given that we decompose the change in cash into nine components and cannot 
necessarily rely on their work to establish the fact that there are no substantial 
differences between the simpler and more complicated measures of cash flows, we 
follow modified versions of their techniques to construct proxies for all the unexpected 
cash flows. We find some quantitative differences among regressions using the four 
different approaches to estimate unexpected cash flows, but the inferences are essentially 
the same in each regression. Therefore we rely on the simpler cash flow measures for 
our analysis. 
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 The dependent variable in the regressions is the risk-adjusted return for the stock 
over the fiscal year corresponding to the time period of the accounting variables on the 
right side of the regression equation. The risk-adjusted return for stock i is calculated by 
subtracting the return of stock i’s benchmark portfolio during fiscal year t from stock i’s 
raw return, where the benchmark portfolio is one of the 25 size and book-to-market 
portfolios defined by Fama and French (1993).
7
 The benchmark portfolio return is value-
weighted within each of the 25 portfolios based on market capitalization, and firms are 
assigned to a benchmark portfolio based on the intersection of independent sorts of 
market equity and book-to-market equity ratios. Calculating the excess return in this 
manner is meant to net out the risk-related expected return component of stock i’s 
realized return. Using raw returns instead of excess returns as the dependent variable 
does not substantially change the results, although the estimated coefficients are larger in 
magnitude with raw returns as the dependent variable.  
 Since there are other firm-specific factors correlated with cash flow that have an 
impact on firm value, we control for these as well. These factors relate to profitability 
and firm decisions regarding financing and investing activities. This list is the same one 
used by Faulkender and Wang, with one exception: their Net Financing (NF) variable is 
highly correlated (0.87) with our cash flow from financing activities variable 
                                                 
7
 Because the fiscal year-end of a firm can be any month while the Fama-French portfolios are formed at 
the end of June each year, a firm can have up to two different benchmark portfolios assigned to it during a 
given fiscal year. Therefore we compound the return of stock i’s assigned benchmark portfolio for each 
month across the 12 months of stock i’s fiscal year, and subtract this annualized return from stock i’s raw 
annual return to arrive at the excess return for that fiscal year for stock i. 
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(FinCFNet) since they are measuring very similar activities. In specifications that 
include FinCFNet or all of its components, we drop NF from the regression. 
 The extended regression model we use is this one: 
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 (2.3) 
where 1[·] denotes the indicator function and ∆Xi,t indicates the change in variable X from 
fiscal year t-1 to year t. The dependent variable is the excess return, , ,
B
i t i tr R , where ri,t is 
the raw return of firm i over its fiscal year t, and ,
B
i tR  is stock i’s assigned annualized 
benchmark return over the same year t. A dollar of cash holdings stemming from net 
positive operating cash flow (OpCF) is valued by investors at 1, whereas a dollar from 
net negative OpCF is valued at 2. The coefficients 3 through 9 can likewise be 
interpreted as the marginal value of cash holdings that come into or leave the firm 
through those sources or uses defined in equation (2.2). The remaining variables are 
control variables:  Ei,t is earnings before interest and extraordinary items, NAi,t is net 
assets (total assets minus cash), RDi,t is research and development expense, Ii,t is interest 
expense, Di,t is common dividends, Ci,t-1 is cash and short-term investments at the end of 
year t-1, and Li,t is market leverage at the end of fiscal year t. All independent variables 
(except leverage and the indicator variable) are scaled by lagged market equity, Mi,t-1. 
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 Our focus is on the magnitude and significance of the γ1 through γ8 coefficients in 
our base specification. We test whether they differ significantly from each other. We 
also test whether γ1=γ2, -γ3=γ4, γ5=-γ6, and γ7=-γ8.
8
 To shed light on differences between 
distressed and non-distressed firms, and constrained and unconstrained firms, we split 
the sample according to the level of distress or financial constraints faced by the firm 
and compare the eight coefficients across the various subsamples. We also test for 
differences among the coefficients within each of the subsamples. 
The regressions use pooled OLS, and the standard errors are clustered at both the 
firm and fiscal year level in order to achieve the most accurate inference, as discussed in 
Petersen (2009), Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011), and Thompson (2011). We have 
25 years of data and thousands of firms, so we can cluster on both time and firm 
dimensions. This method allows for the possibility that the residuals across the 
observations for the same firm may be correlated across years, as well as the concurrent 
possibility that the residuals across the observations for the same fiscal year may be 
correlated across firms. Both scenarios seem reasonable and are supported by a 
preliminary analysis. In untabulated results we perform our base regressions clustering 
errors only by firm and including time fixed effects. Some of the standard errors increase 
substantially when we use two-dimensional clustering (standard errors increase on 
variables of interest by a range of 30% to 165% versus the one-dimensional clustering), 
                                                 
8
 The minus signs in the coefficient tests are used to account for the fact that some variables are defined to 
increase as cash holdings increase (such as Divest), and some variables increase as cash holdings decrease 
(such as Invest). 
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which indicates correlation of residuals in both dimensions. To be conservative, we only 
report statistical significance based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions. 
Although both sides of the regression model in equation (2.3) appear to wash out 
any unobserved effects since the equation is effectively defined in terms of differences, 
it is still possible that unobservable effects exist that are correlated with the independent 
variables as well as with abnormal returns. If this is the case, then the regression results 
suffer from omitted variable bias. However, if these unobservable factors are time 
invariant, fixed effects can be useful in eliminating this bias. Therefore in order to verify 
the robustness of our findings, in untabulated results we re-estimate all of our models 
using fixed effects regressions, using both firm and year fixed effects. This methodology 
uses only the time series variation within each firm to estimate the coefficients. Most of 
the magnitudes of the cash flow coefficients are larger in these results, but none of the 
prior inferences changes substantially. These results show that unobserved effects tend 
to attenuate the estimated cash flow coefficients, not magnify them. 
2.4 Data and Summary Statistics 
 The data are from CRSP and Compustat. The sample begins in fiscal 1987, since 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95 (1987) required firms to provide a 
detailed statement of cash flows beginning then. We begin gathering data prior to 1987, 
however, so that benchmark portfolios can be assigned using historical data on size and 
book-to-market once cash flow data become available in 1987. The sample includes data 
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through the end of December 2011, for a total of up to 25 annual observations per firm.
9
 
Cash flow and firm financial data are on an annual basis. Stock returns include the 
impact of distributions, and the returns correspond to the same time period as the firm’s 
fiscal year. The 25 benchmark portfolios formed from the intersection of independent 
sorts on size (market equity) into quintiles and book-to-market (book equity/market 
equity) into quintiles are from Kenneth R. French’s website.10 The website provides 
detailed instructions for defining the variables and assigning the benchmark portfolios 
using those breakpoints. 
We exclude firm-year observations in which total assets or market equity values 
are nonpositive, or in which net assets (total assets minus cash) are negative. Using the 
historical SIC code in Compustat, we remove firms that are financials and utilities (SIC 
codes of 6000-6999 and 4900-4999, respectively) because the relations between cash 
flow components and firm value may be different for those firms. Finally, dependent and 
independent variables with realizations in the sub-1% and over-99% tails of the sample 
distribution of that variable are trimmed (i.e., set to missing) to reduce the impact of 
extreme observations, and any observations not containing all the basic variables 
required for at least one of the regressions are dropped. The final sample includes 78,370 
firm-year observations for 10,540 unique firms. 
                                                 
9
 Compustat data came from the FUNDA file dated 2/27/2012. Compared to fiscal 2010, fiscal 2011 has 
less than half the number of firm-year observations. This is because Compustat data was not yet available 
for all the firms with a December 2011 fiscal year-end, and firm-years with a fiscal year-end from January 
to May 2012 (still fiscal 2011 according to Compustat) would not have been included anyway since our 
matching CRSP data ends in December 2011. 
10
 We thank Kenneth French for making these data available. The website is located at: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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 All dollar-related variables are converted to 2010 dollars using the “All Urban 
Consumers” Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For the purposes 
of deflating variables by the lagged market value of equity, market equity is calculated 
as common shares outstanding times the share price at fiscal year-end. Table A-1 (in the 
Appendix) contains the Compustat Xpressfeed codes behind all variable constructions. 
Cash flow from operating activities (OpCF) and cash flow from financing 
activities (FinCFNet) are taken directly from Compustat without modification. Cash 
flow from investing activities (InvCFNet) is calculated as net cash flow from investing 
activities plus three adjustments:  plus any increase in investments, less any sale of 
investments, less any change in short-term investments. Cash flow from investing 
activities (IVNCF in Compustat) must be populated in order to calculate InvCFNet, but 
any missing observations for any of the three adjustment variables are set to zero. The 
reason for these adjustments is that “cash” is usually defined as “cash and short-term 
investments” in this literature, but the statement of cash flows is concerned specifically 
with explaining changes in the cash balance alone, ignoring short-term investments. In 
some firms, large amounts of cash move back and forth between cash and short-term 
investments. These movements can significantly affect the investing portion of the cash 
flow statement, even when the firm in question may be investing very little in non-
financial assets.
11
 Results using the unmodified cash flow from investing variable are 
                                                 
11
 For example, Cascade Microtech ended fiscal 2009 with $19.5 million in cash. However, during that 
year investing activities provided the firm with $15.4 million in cash (79% of the firm’s ending cash 
balance), composed partly of “proceeds from sale of marketable securities” of $37.4 million less “purchase 
of marketable securities” of $20.3 million. In a study of changes in “cash and short-term investments,” 
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similar to those reported, although the coefficients on investing cash flow are smaller, 
and the R
2
s of the models are slightly lower.  
In most of the specifications we split InvCFNet and FinCFNet into their gross 
positive and negative components. To do this for the negative portion of investing cash 
flows (Invest), we sum capital expenditures and acquisitions. Any realizations of 
“investing activities–other” that have a negative value are added to this sum (after first 
converting the value to a positive figure to be consistent with the other measures). For 
the positive portion (Divest), we take the sum of sales of property, plant and equipment 
and any positive realizations of “investing activities–other.” 
Financing cash flows are decomposed into five items in total. Debt issuance 
(DebtIssue) is the sum of long-term debt issuance and any positive realizations of 
“changes in current debt.” Debt retirement (DebtRetire) is the reduction of long-term 
debt plus any negative realizations of “changes in current debt” (after converting the 
value to a positive figure first). Equity issuance (EqIssue) is the proceeds from the sale 
of common and preferred stock. Equity payout (EqPayout) is the sum of the purchase of 
common and preferred stock and cash dividends. Finally, other financing (FinOther) is 
the sum of the excess tax benefit of stock options and “financing activities – other.” In 
all these cases, missing variables are each treated as zeros. 
                                                                                                                                                
these relatively large transfers among cash and very liquid short-term securities are not meaningful. In this 
specific case, our method changes the raw $15.4 million of positive investing cash flow in Compustat to 
$1.7 million of negative investing cash flow (i.e., a use of cash): $15.4 million - $37.4 million + $20.3 
million = -$1.7 million. 
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We take additional steps to clean the cash flow data. First, for many of the 
variables, their native sign in Compustat should be positive. We eliminate 164 
observations for which this is not the case. Next we calculate the difference between 
each net cash flow variable (InvCFNet and FinCFNet) and the sum of its components. 
We require the absolute value of this difference to be no greater than 1×10
-6
 (recall that 
all variables have been scaled by lagged market equity).
12
 We conduct this step because 
by treating all missing variables as zeros in the calculation of the gross cash flow 
components, we may inadvertently introduce large measurement errors in some cases 
where the missing variables are not innocuous. Only 133 observations which were 
otherwise valid are discarded in this step.
13
 All remaining observations are then trimmed 
at the 1% and 99% levels as are the other variables. 
For the control variables, we follow Faulkender and Wang (2006). Earnings are 
defined as income before extraordinary items plus interest expense, deferred tax credits 
and investment tax credits. Adjustments are set to zero if missing. Net assets are total 
assets less cash and short-term investments. Research and development expense, interest 
expense, and common dividends are set to zero if missing. Cash is “cash and short-term 
                                                 
12
 Although one might prefer to require a difference of zero between the sum of the gross components of 
the cash flows and the reported net cash flows, rounding errors result in over half the sample having a non-
zero difference. In over 99% of the cases, however, the absolute value of the difference is less than 
1.8×10
-7
, which approaches the precision of the data types used for storing the variables. The differences 
are relatively symmetric around zero from at least the 1
st
 to the 99
th
 percentiles, with a median difference 
of zero. 
13
 If the net cash flow variable (InvCFNet or FinCFNet) associated with the gross components were 
missing, we would eliminate the observation since we could not be certain of the final net cash flow. In 
our sample, however, any observations that would have been eliminated in this step were already missing 
a key variable such as OpCF, so no additional observations were lost. 
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investments.” Market leverage is defined as book debt divided by the sum of book debt 
and market equity. Net financing, when used, is defined as sales of stock, less purchases 
of stock, plus debt proceeds, less debt retirements, and missing variables within the 
calculation are set to zero. 
Summary statistics for the final sample of 78,370 observations are reported in 
Table 2.3. The mean abnormal annual return is -1.3%, while the median is -8.9%, 
consistent with a right-skewed distribution. Cash flow from operating activities (OpCF) 
is clearly the largest net source of cash, on average bringing in the equivalent of 8.2% of 
the firm’s prior-year market equity in the form of cash each year. Net cash flow from 
investing activities (InvCFNet) tends to be firms’ largest use of cash on average, 
at -9.4% of prior-period equity value, with a median value of -5.4% of prior equity. The 
largest portion of InvCFNet is associated with capital expenditures and acquisitions 
(Invest). Divesting (Divest) supplies a relatively small amount of cash in most firm-
years. 
Cash flow from financing activities (FinCFNet) is almost as likely to be positive 
as negative (median= -0.1% of prior market equity). Although many firms have little 
movement in FinCFNet on a net basis, there are still large amounts of financing activity 
in the average firm-year. Debt issues bring in 13.6% of prior market equity in cash in the 
average firm-year, and debt reduction uses up almost the same amount (12.7%). 
However, these numbers reflect the influence of very large debt rollovers since both 
means are above the third quartile for each of their respective distributions. Cash flows 
related to equity financing tend to be less dramatic: stock issues bring in 2.8% of prior 
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market equity in the average firm-year, while dividends and repurchases distribute 1.9% 
of lagged equity value. Once again, the medians are lower still. Both stock-related 
measures are close to 0.3% of lagged market equity in the median firm-year. Other 
financing items (FinOther) tend to be at or near zero.  
 
Table 2.3 
Summary Statistics. 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables in the final sample of firm-years described in the text for the 
period 1987-2011. Variables are defined in detail in Table A-1. All variables except for AbnRett and Lt are converted 
to real 2010 dollars and then deflated by the lagged market value of equity. Variables have each been trimmed at the 
1% tails of each distribution. ∆Xt denotes the 1-year change of variable X from year t-1 to year t (∆Xt = Xt - Xt-1). 
 
 
Variable Description Mean
1st 
Quartile Median
3rd 
Quartile SD N
AbnRett Benchmark-adjusted return -0.0126 -0.3449 -0.0887 0.1974 0.5335 78,370   
Ct Change in cash 0.0024 -0.0316 0.0001 0.0320 0.1114 77,952   
OpCFt Operating cashflow 0.0821 0.0098 0.0744 0.1452 0.1609 75,064   
InvCFNett Investing cashflow (net) -0.0943 -0.1227 -0.0542 -0.0186 0.1472 74,933   
  Investt   Investing cashflow (gross) 0.1152 0.0263 0.0648 0.1396 0.1526 74,845   
  Divestt   Divesting cashflow 0.0206 0.0000 0.0005 0.0086 0.0661 74,953   
FinCFNett Financing cashflow 0.0194 -0.0476 -0.0010 0.0557 0.1803 75,168   
  DebtIssuet   Debt financing-issuance 0.1359 0.0000 0.0109 0.1229 0.3225 73,096   
  DebtRetiret   Debt financing-reduction 0.1270 0.0007 0.0211 0.1072 0.3075 73,096   
  EqIssuet   Equity financing-issuance 0.0284 0.0002 0.0035 0.0124 0.0801 73,096   
  EqPayoutt   Equity financing-payout 0.0193 0.0000 0.0034 0.0288 0.0308 73,096   
  FinOthert   Financing- other -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0165 76,079   
Et Change in earnings 0.0105 -0.0315 0.0051 0.0382 0.1750 78,370   
NAt Change in net assets 0.0222 -0.0600 0.0173 0.1097 0.3235 78,370   
RDt Change in Research & Dev. -0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.0185 78,370   
It Change in interest expense 0.0003 -0.0023 0.0000 0.0028 0.0177 78,370   
Dt Change in dividends -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0056 78,370   
Ct-1 Lagged cash 0.1583 0.0317 0.0888 0.2051 0.1977 78,370   
Lt Market leverage 0.2081 0.0170 0.1422 0.3340 0.2159 78,370   
NFt Net financing 0.0284 -0.0290 0.0006 0.0507 0.1695 78,164   
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 Compared to Faulkender and Wang (2006), the distribution of the change in cash 
variable (∆C) is similar. The mean and median are both close to zero. Lagged cash levels 
(Ct-1) measured at the mean or median are slightly lower than in their sample. Market 
leverage (L) declines substantially after 2002, helping explain the lower leverage in this 
sample (mean of 0.21 in this sample versus almost 0.28 in Faulkender and Wang). While 
firms increase their profitability over the sample period (∆E>0), research and 
development expenditures (∆RD), interest (∆I), and dividends (∆D) change very little 
during that time. 
 The summary statistics provide additional evidence for the idea that there is 
substantial variation in the components of the change in cash across firms and through 
time. The aggregate “change in cash” measure obscures this variability. From the table it 
is apparent that except for divesting and the equity-related financing measures, all of the 
cash flow components (both net and gross) have higher standard deviations than does the 
change in cash. Untabulated results confirm that this pattern also extends to the variation 
between firms as well as within firms across time. 
 Additional evidence of the variation in the components of the change in cash 
comes from Table 2.4. This table provides mean annual values from the statements of 
cash flows of all firm-years in the sample. The mean firm-year has positive operating 
cash flows of $381 million, and the firm invests a large proportion of that amount in 
capital expenditures and acquisitions. A smaller but still substantial amount of cash is 
raised through divesting activities. On the financing side, $244 million of old debt is 
retired, and an amount larger than this is raised via debt securities. Equity issues raise 
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$31 million in cash, while dividends and repurchases use up $134 million. When all 
items from all categories are summed, however, the net change in cash over the year is 
an increase of only $19 million for the mean firm, increasing the prior cash balance by 
about six percent. In studying the marginal value of cash, extant literature has focused its 
efforts on this $19 million. 
 
Table 2.4 
Statement of Cash Flows (Mean Values of the Sample). 
This table presents the mean values of the components of the annual statements of cash flows for the whole sample 
(1987-2011). Values are expressed in 2010 millions of dollars. N=72,147 firm-year observations for which all 
variables are non-missing. 
 
 
Operating Activities
Net cash flows from operating activities 381
Investing Activities
Capital expenditures/acquisitions (321)
Divestitures 54
Other investing (28)
Net cash flows used in investing activities (295)
Financing Activities
Debt issuance 285
Debt retirement (244)
Equity issuance 31
Equity payout (134)
Other financing (5)
Net cash flows used in financing activities (67)
Net increase in cash 19
Cash, beginning of year 311
Cash, end of year 330
  
3
2
 
Table 2.5 
Pearson and Spearman Correlations. 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are below (above) the diagonal. Variables are defined in Table A-1. ∆Xt denotes the 1-year change of variable X from year t-1 to year t 
(∆Xt = Xt - Xt-1). 
 
 
N=72,675
AbnRett ATadjt Ct OpCFt InvNett Investt Divestt FinCFt +Debtt -Debtt +Eqtyt -Eqtyt Et NAt RDt It Dt Ct-1 Lt NFt
AbnRett 1 0.13 0.22 0.25 -0.11 0.11 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.32 0.21 0.06 -0.07 0.09 0.01 -0.18 0.01
ATadjt 0.01 1 0.10 0.33 -0.22 0.27 0.24 -0.15 0.23 0.18 -0.02 0.44 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.16 0.25 -0.07
Ct 0.22 0.01 1 0.30 0.09 -0.06 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.02 0.16 -0.01 0.16 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.25 -0.05 0.15
OpCFt 0.18 0.09 0.32 1 -0.42 0.46 0.22 -0.44 0.11 0.37 -0.16 0.31 0.15 -0.06 -0.03 -0.16 0.03 -0.10 0.26 -0.32
InvCFNett -0.08 -0.03 0.10 -0.34 1 -0.91 -0.04 -0.23 -0.43 -0.30 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 -0.42 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.07 -0.40 -0.22
Investt 0.08 0.04 -0.06 0.37 -0.92 1 0.28 0.14 0.48 0.41 -0.08 0.12 0.03 0.35 0.00 0.14 0.01 -0.07 0.50 0.14
Divestt -0.01 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.17 0.24 1 -0.17 0.21 0.31 -0.14 0.17 0.04 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.31 -0.13
FinCFNett 0.04 -0.04 0.21 -0.43 -0.47 0.40 -0.16 1 0.31 -0.20 0.30 -0.36 -0.02 0.44 0.08 0.36 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.84
DebtIssuet 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 -0.37 0.41 0.12 0.26 1 0.56 -0.08 0.08 -0.02 0.24 -0.04 0.25 0.01 -0.29 0.63 0.29
DebtRetiret 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.25 -0.16 0.24 0.20 -0.10 0.90 1 -0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 -0.22 0.63 -0.15
EqIssuet 0.17 -0.04 0.28 -0.18 -0.10 0.09 -0.01 0.45 0.02 0.05 1 -0.12 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.22 0.32
EqPayoutt 0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.05 -0.21 0.01 0.00 -0.09 1 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 -0.08 0.08 -0.27
Et 0.23 -0.01 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.02 1 0.17 -0.07 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.06 0.00
NAt 0.17 0.03 -0.06 -0.10 -0.47 0.39 -0.18 0.50 0.17 -0.06 0.12 0.00 0.10 1 0.17 0.29 0.15 -0.06 -0.02 0.39
RDt 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.14 0.14 1 0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.11 0.07
It -0.05 -0.01 0.00 -0.16 -0.21 0.18 -0.05 0.35 0.16 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.31 0.03 1 0.02 -0.08 0.12 0.32
Dt 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.01 1 -0.07 -0.07 0.02
Ct-1 0.04 -0.02 -0.28 -0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03 1 -0.21 -0.08
Lt -0.23 0.08 -0.05 0.21 -0.34 0.42 0.22 0.07 0.43 0.38 -0.08 0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.03 0.10 -0.09 -0.07 1 0.00
NFt 0.06 -0.01 0.22 -0.30 -0.46 0.40 -0.13 0.87 0.29 -0.04 0.48 -0.16 -0.03 0.44 0.04 0.32 0.03 -0.07 0.07 1
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 Pearson and Spearman correlations among the key regression variables are 
presented in Table 2.5. The idea that the overall change in cash does not move in 
lockstep with its constituent cash flows is further supported by the correlations between 
the change in cash and the net cash flows. The strongest connection is between OpCF 
and C, with partial correlations of only 0.32 and 0.30 for Pearson and Spearman 
correlations, respectively. Correlations among the net cash flow variables are also not 
particularly high. The -0.47 Pearson correlation between InvCFNet and FinCFNet is the 
largest in magnitude among all Pearson cash flow correlations between the net cash flow 
variables. The corresponding Spearman correlation of only -0.23, however, implies that 
relatively large (absolute) values drive part of the Pearson correlation. Debt issues and 
reductions have a very high Pearson correlation (0.90), but this is driven by some of the 
most extreme firm-year observations of those variables. (Excluding the most extreme 
5% of the observations causes the Pearson correlation to more closely resemble the 
Spearman correlation of 0.56.) Correlations between Invest and DebtIssue or OpCF are 
between 0.37 and 0.48 (both Pearson and Spearman), whereas the univariate relation 
between Invest and EqIssue is unclear: the correlation magnitudes are small and the 
signs differ between Pearson and Spearman. 
2.5 Financial Distress and Financial Constraint Measures 
 To examine differences in cash valuation related to financial distress and 
financial constraints, we require methods to identify financially distressed or constrained 
firms and also financially strong or unconstrained firms. We use a simple method for 
determining whether or not a firm is facing distress. If net operating cash flow for the 
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past two consecutive years was positive, the firm is considered to be strong or further 
from distress. If this cash flow for the past two years was negative, the firm is considered 
to be troubled or closer to distress. This method is similar in spirit to one used in Whited 
and Wu (2006), in which they remove firms from their sample that have had more than 
two quarters of negative sales growth. Their intent is to focus only on external financial 
constraints, and they want to avoid picking up any information about financial distress. 
In our case we examine both constraints and distress in separate analyses. 
To identify whether a given firm is financially constrained or unconstrained, we 
rely upon four different classification schemes. Most other existing schemes produce 
classifications that are highly correlated with at least one of these four. We report results 
using all four methods. 
1. Whited-Wu (2006) index: Using a GMM estimation of an investment Euler equation, 
Whited and Wu (2006) create a structural index to identify the degree to which a 
firm is financially constrained. We replicate their index for our sample and, for each 
year from 1987 to 2011, we sort firms by the index.
14
 Observations in the top 
(bottom) tercile of each annual financial constraint index distribution are considered 
to represent financially constrained (unconstrained) firms. Firm-years in the middle 
tercile are discarded. 
                                                 
14
 Since Whited and Wu use quarterly data to construct their index, we modify their formula slightly to 
account for our annual data: we divide our annual cash flow figure by four. Since there is no obvious way 
to convert the sales growth figures from annual to quarterly numbers, we make no modification for those 
variables. 
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2. Hadlock-Pierce (2010) SA index: Hadlock and Pierce (2010) gather detailed 
qualitative information on a random sample of firms and use this information to 
categorize firms as financially constrained or unconstrained. They find that firm size, 
the square of firm size, and firm age are the most important predictors of the degree 
of financial constraint for a firm. We replicate their index and sort firms each year by 
the index. Observations in the top (bottom) tercile of each annual SA index 
distribution are considered to represent financially constrained (unconstrained) firms. 
Firm-years in the middle tercile are discarded. 
3. Payout ratio: This method is used by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), 
Faulkender and Wang (2006), and others. The payout ratio is measured as the sum of 
dividends plus stock repurchases divided by operating income before depreciation. 
Firms with high payout ratios are returning larger portions of their earnings to 
shareholders and are therefore considered less financially constrained. Each year 
firms are sorted by their payout ratios. Observations in the top (bottom) tercile of 
each annual payout ratio distribution are considered to represent financially 
unconstrained (constrained) firms, and firm-years in the middle tercile are discarded. 
We follow Li and Zhang (2010) and modify our calculation for observations in 
which operating income before depreciation is nonpositive. For these observations, if 
the numerator of the ratio is positive, we classify the firm as unconstrained; if the 
numerator of the ratio is zero, we classify the firm as constrained. 
4. Long-term bond rating: This method is also used by Almeida, Campello, and 
Weisbach (2004), Faulkender and Wang (2006), and others. The motivation for this 
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method is that firms with debt outstanding that have received a long-term bond rating 
are likely to have better access to capital. This is because investors of all types may 
know more about the firm and its ability to pay off its debt. For this measure, we 
consider all firm-years with positive debt and a long-term credit rating (in 
Compustat) to be financially unconstrained. Firm-years with positive debt and no 
long-term credit rating are deemed financially constrained. Those without debt are 
discarded. 
Within the full sample of observations, the lowest pairwise correlation between 
constraint indicators is between the payout ratio indicator and the long-term bond rating 
indicator at 0.29 (untabulated). The highest, at 0.98, is between the WW index indicator 
and the SA index indicator. The distress indicator has a weaker relation with the 
constraint indicators: the pairwise correlation ranges from 0.23 with the bond rating 
indicator to 0.53 with the SA index indicator.  
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Results for the Full Sample 
This section provides results for our first two questions. The maximum sample 
size is used in all regressions, so the sample sizes differ depending on which independent 
variables are in each specification. Table 2.6 contains results for the first set of 
regressions. Model 1 replicates Model I from Table II of Faulkender and Wang (2006). 
While their estimated coefficient for the change in cash is 0.751, ours is 1.118. Their 
sample covers 1971 through 2001, whereas our sample covers 1987 through 2011. 
Untabulated results analyzing the data by decade from 1971 to 2011 reveal that there is  
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Table 2.6 
Full Sample Regressions. 
The dependent variable is the FF-25 benchmark-adjusted abnormal return over the 12 months matching each fiscal 
year (AbnRett). Variables are defined in detail in Table A-1. All explanatory variables (except Lt) are scaled by prior-
period market equity. p-values based on robust standard errors (clustered by both firm and fiscal year per Cameron, 
Gelbach, and Miller 2011 and Thompson 2011) are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Cashflow-related 
coefficients with the same superscript in the same column do not statistically differ from each other at the 5% level or 
better. 
 
Variable Description 1 2 3 4
Ct Change in cash 1.118
(0.000)
Ct×1[C>0] Change in cash if >0 1.324
(0.000)
Ct×1[C≤0] Change in cash if ≤0 0.410
(0.000)
OpCFt Operating cashflow 1.271
(0.000)
OpCFt×1[OpCF>0] Oper. cashflow if >0 1.400
b
(0.000)
OpCFt×1[OpCF≤0] Oper. cashflow if ≤0 0.100
a
(0.214)
InvCFNett Investing cashflow (net) 0.464
(0.000)
Investt Investing cashflow (gross) -0.394
c
(0.000)
Divestt Divesting cashflow 0.676
(0.000)
FinCFNett Financing cashflow 0.795
(0.000)
DebtIssuet Debt financing-issuance 0.563
(0.000)
DebtRetiret Debt financing-reduction -0.449
c
(0.000)
EqIssuet Equity financing-issuance 1.245
b
(0.000)
EqPayoutt Equity financing-payout -0.213
a,c
(0.186)
FinOthert Financing-other 0.511
(0.000)
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Table 2.6 Continued 
 
  
Variable Description 1 2 3 4
Et Change in earnings 0.510 0.503 0.507 0.451
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NAt Change in net assets 0.314 0.318 0.214 0.257
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RDt Change in Research & Dev. 0.914 0.930 0.751 0.934
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
It Change in interest expense -2.369 -2.279 -1.805 -1.337
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dt Change in dividends 1.718 1.697 1.535 1.314
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Ct-1 Lagged cash 0.270 0.153 0.217 0.153
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lt Market leverage -0.423 -0.427 -0.617 -0.734
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NFt Net financing -0.094 -0.125
(0.027) (0.002)
Dummy (1[C>0]) 0.061
(0.000)
Dummy (1[OpCF>0]) 0.086
(0.000)
Intercept 0.019 -0.021 -0.007 -0.134
(0.034) (0.032) (0.483) (0.000)
N Obs 77,792 77,792 74,555 72,426
Adj. R-squared 0.166 0.172 0.195 0.226
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an upward secular trend in this coefficient.
15
 The other coefficients are identical in sign 
and similar in magnitude and significance, except for net financing, which is positive for 
Faulkender and Wang and negative in our sample. 
In Model 2 we allow the cash change coefficient to differ based on the sign of the 
change in cash in order to determine whether cash increases and decreases have the same 
value. There is an apparent kink in the slope of the relation between the change in cash 
and benchmark-adjusted returns at zero change in cash. Net cash increases are valued 91 
cents higher than are net cash decreases, and the difference is statistically significant. 
The very low coefficient on changes in cash when they are negative (0.41) implies that 
investors lower their valuations of the firm by only a fraction of the amount of a 
decrease in cash.  
Model 3 decomposes the change in cash into its three main constituent net cash 
flows as in equation (2.1). The results show that a dollar of cash generated from 
operating activities is valued more highly than the other two components at $1.27. Thus 
an incremental dollar of cash from operations provides more than a single dollar of value 
to the firm. We conjecture that the value differential is related to the signaling to 
investors of information about the likelihood of future operational cash flows (caused by 
information asymmetry), and/or by relieving the firm of the need to raise costly external 
financing. Cash derived from net investing (a positive value for which would mean the 
firm divested more assets than it invested) receives the lowest valuation at $0.46, and 
                                                 
15
 Bates, Chang, and Chi (2011), Chung, Jung, and Park (2011), and Keefe and Kieschnick (2011) study 
this fact in detail. 
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cash generated from financing activities is in the middle at $0.80. All of these 
coefficients differ significantly from each other (p-values of the three differences are less 
than 0.0001). These results show that the origin of the change in cash is important to 
investors’ valuation of the cash. These three sources of cash differ from each other in 
fundamental ways regarding transaction or adjustment costs, agency costs, and 
information asymmetry, which suggests that these dimensions affect the valuation of the 
firm’s cash holdings. 
Recall from the summary statistics in Table 2.3 that operating cash flows are 
usually cash inflows to the firm, investing cash flows are usually cash outflows, and 
financing cash flows are about as likely to be inflows as outflows in a given firm-year. 
The results from Models 2 and 3 along with these distributional facts imply that 
investors’ cash valuations may further depend on the sign of the cash flow, not just its 
category. In addition, changes in debt and equity are related to a firm’s market value in 
different ways. Therefore in Model 4 we further disaggregate the investing and financing 
cash flows and we allow the operating cash flow coefficients to vary depending on the 
sign of the net cash flow. Net investing is split into gross investing and divesting, and net 
financing is split into debt, equity, and other financing, where debt and equity are each 
further split into “issuance” (both debt and equity) and “reduction” (debt) or “payout” 
(equity) variables. 
Surprisingly, negative realizations of net operating cash flow hardly change firm 
value at all, with a $0.10 decline in firm value for every $1.00 of operating cash flow 
loss (p-value of 0.21). Positive realizations receive a much higher value of $1.40. 
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Investing activities (on a gross basis) lower firm value by $0.39 for every invested 
dollar, but a dollar coming from divesting is valued at $0.68. A dollar generated from 
issuing debt is worth $0.56, but a dollar from equity issuance, valued at $1.25, is 
statistically equivalent to a dollar of net positive operating cash flow (indicated by the 
matching superscripts for those coefficients). Statistically there is no significant 
difference in value among a dollar used to invest, a dollar used to reduce debt principal, 
or a dollar used to pay a dividend or repurchase stock—all three reduce firm value. The 
adjusted R
2
 increases again, now up to 0.226 in Model 4, demonstrating the improved fit 
of the model. 
Thus, investors place different values on most of a firm’s cash holdings based on 
its sources and uses. The differences are both statistically and economically significant. 
Cash inflows related to operating activities are worth approximately twice the amount 
that investors attribute to divesting or debt issuance cash inflows. Contrary to the 
expectations of the results in a frictionless world, the influx of dollars from debt and 
equity issues raises firm value while the outflow of dollars to reduce debt lowers firm 
value. (Equity payouts have no significant effect, but the point estimate is also negative.) 
These deviations from perfect markets expectations imply that agency costs, financial 
constraints, or other factors have an impact on how investors value different cash flows 
in the firm. Addressing our fourth question, results for Model 4 appear most consistent 
with agency costs and information asymmetry being the most significant frictions in the 
sample of all firms. Information asymmetry could result in operating cash flows having a 
value over $1.00, and agency costs could explain some of the nonzero values associated 
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with financing activities and the negative impact of investing. Divesting and equity 
payout coefficients are close to those predicted for the frictionless scenario. 
Regarding our second question, the results imply that investors have asymmetric 
valuations of cash increases and decreases for each of the three main cash sources. The 
differences are both statistically and economically significant. In the most extreme case, 
there is a $1.30 difference in value per dollar of negative versus positive net operating 
cash flows. 
One other interesting result from Model 4 in Table 2.6 is that investing cash 
flows appear to reduce firm value. For every $1.00 of incremental investment in the 
mean firm-year, firm value is reduced by 39 cents. If firms invest optimally, firm value 
should not be reduced by investment, but it could be increased. We conjecture that 
although some firms may be investing optimally, others may be underinvesting or 
overinvesting. To test this idea, we divide investing cash flows into terciles to allow the 
possibility of a non-linear relation between investing and firm value. The results are 
shown in Table 2.7, but the control variables are untabulated. Model 1 replicates Model 
4 of Table 2.6 for ease of comparison. Model 2 reveals that the third tercile of investing 
cash flows (with the largest amounts of investing) is responsible for the negative impact 
upon firm value in Model 1. Firms with smaller to moderate amounts of investing 
(terciles 1 and 2) have either a very positive relation between investing cash flows and 
firm value (tercile 1), or no statistically significant relation between investing cash flows 
and firm value (tercile 2, with a p-value of .93). For firms in the first tercile, an 
incremental dollar of investing is associated with an increase in firm value of almost four 
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Table 2.7 
Regressions with Investing Terciles. 
The dependent variable is the FF-25 benchmark-adjusted abnormal return over the 12 months matching each fiscal 
year (AbnRett). Variables are defined in detail in Table A-1. All explanatory variables are scaled by prior-period 
market equity. Unreported control variables are the same as those in Model 4 of Table 2.6, plus dummy variables for 
investing terciles 1 and 2. p-values based on robust standard errors (clustered by both firm and fiscal year per 
Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011 and Thompson 2011) are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
Cashflow-related coefficients with the same superscript in the same column do not statistically differ from each other 
at the 5% level or better, but for models 2-4, only differences among investing tercile coefficients are tested. 
 
Variable Description 1 2 3 4
Subsample:
All All
WW Index 
Unconstr.
WW Index 
Constr.
p -value 
(3=4)
OpCFt×1[OpCF>0] Oper. cashflow if >0 1.400
b
1.403 1.241 1.432 0.05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCFt×1[OpCF≤0] Oper. cashflow if ≤0 0.100
a
0.133 -0.125 0.250 0.00
(0.214) (0.083) (0.302) (0.010)
Investt Investing cashflow (gross) -0.394
c
(0.000)
Investt Tercile 1 (smallest) 3.857 1.929 4.382 0.01
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Investt Tercile 2 -0.015 0.252 -0.325
a
0.08
(0.928) (0.328) (0.349)
Investt Tercile 3 (largest) -0.599 -0.336 -0.645
a
0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestt Divesting cashflow 0.676 0.700 0.514 0.672 0.15
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtIssuet Debt financing-issuance 0.563 0.615 0.405 0.712 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtRetiret Debt financing-reduction -0.449
c
-0.496 -0.298 -0.546 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssuet Equity financing-issuance 1.245
b
1.265 1.076 1.392 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqPayoutt Equity financing-payout -0.213
a,c
-0.280 -0.058 -0.668 0.01
(0.186) (0.083) (0.711) (0.010)
FinOthert Financing-other 0.511 0.500 0.226 0.656 0.14
(0.000) (0.000) (0.071) (0.007)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
N Obs 72,426 72,426 26,410 21,681
Adj. R-squared 0.226 0.233 0.225 0.230
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dollars (3.857). The relation between investing and firm value therefore has an inverted 
U-shape: firms in the first tercile appear to be underinvesting, while firms in the third 
appear to be overinvesting. 
Models 3 and 4 analyze subsamples based on financial constraints as defined by 
the Whited-Wu index.
16
 These models show that the difference between the first tercile 
and the third tercile of investing cash flows is more acute for firms with greater financial 
constraints. That is, the inverted U-shape is steeper for firms with greater financial 
constraints. The differences in coefficients between the subsamples for the first and third 
terciles of investing cash flows are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Financially constrained firms that make relatively small investments may have binding 
constraints that prevent them from pursuing some profitable projects. An apparent 
agency cost problem afflicting firms in the third investing tercile appears to be more 
severe for firms facing financial constraints, or perhaps the constrained firms in the third 
tercile have overpaid for financing compared to the unconstrained firms. 
2.6.2 Alternative Methods of Calculating Unexpected Cash Flows 
In order to verify our results, we consider additional ways of measuring 
unexpected cash flows. Thus far we have been using the full amount of the cash flows 
with the implicit assumption that investors have no specific expectations for cash flows 
in the upcoming year. In this section, we consider three alternative methods for 
                                                 
16
 In later results (Table 2.10) we show that there is less of a difference in the Invest coefficients between 
the constraint subsamples when using the Whited-Wu financial constraint measure. That is why we use 
that measure here: there is less of a chance of finding differences between the subsamples using it. 
Differences using the other measures (untabulated) are similar to these.  
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estimating the cash flow expectations in place at the beginning of each fiscal year, since 
those expectations should already be reflected in the stock price. Then we subtract these 
expectations from the realized values in order to calculate the eight unexpected cash 
flows for each firm-year.
17
 For this purpose, we follow the spirit of Faulkender and 
Wang (2006), who consider three alternative measures of the expected changes in cash.  
The first method is to use the average cash flow realizations of each benchmark 
portfolio as the expected cash flows for each firm. Since the benchmark portfolio stock 
return is weighted by the market capitalization of each firm, we also use market values 
of equity to weight each firm in the benchmark portfolio to arrive at the portfolio’s 
average realized cash flows. Then to determine the unexpected cash flow for each of the 
eight cash flow components for each firm, we subtract the benchmark portfolio’s 
average cash flow from the firm’s realized cash flow and consider the difference to be 
the unexpected cash flow for that component.  
 The second and third measures of unexpected cash flows are modifications of 
those used by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) to calculate unexpected changes 
in cash. Both measures involve separately regressing each of the realized cash flow 
measures on the lagged value of that measure along with other lagged variables that 
represent cash flow changes, investment opportunities, size, and in the third measure, 
other sources and uses of cash. The second measure (labeled “ACW(1)”) follows this 
                                                 
17
 We consolidate the OpCF measure into a single variable instead of splitting it based on its sign, leaving 
eight cash flow components. Since we take differences between realized and expected cash flows in order 
to calculate unexpected cash flows, trying to maintain separate OpCF variables based on sign would be 
cumbersome. 
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specification, used in eight separate regressions for the eight separate cash flow 
components: 
 , 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i tCF CF TotalCashFlow Q LogAssets               (2.4) 
where CF represents each of the eight cash flow components in turn (OpCF, Invest, 
Divest, DebtIssue, DebtRetire, EqIssue, EqPayout, FinOther), TotalCashFlow is income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation less total dividends, Q is the market value 
of assets divided by the book value of assets, and LogAssets is the natural log of total 
book assets. Each of the cash flow variables is scaled by the lagged market value of 
assets as opposed to the market value of equity as is done in the rest of Section 2. The 
regressions control for industry fixed effects at the two-digit SIC level and generate 
predicted cash flow amounts for each cash flow component for each firm-year. These 
predicted or expected cash flows are subtracted from the realized cash flows to calculate 
the unexpected portion of the cash flow component. 
 The third and final measure of unexpected cash flows (labeled “ACW(2)”) uses 
this expanded regression specification: 
 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1
4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 , ,  
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
CF CF TotalCashFlow Q LogAssets
CAPX Acquisitions NWC ShortDebt
    
    
   
   
     
    
 (2.5) 
where capital expenditures, acquisitions, changes in net working capital, and changes in 
short term debt, all of which are scaled by lagged market value of assets, are included in 
addition to the variables explained in equation (2.4). Again we control for industry fixed 
effects, and the predicted cash flows from these regressions are subtracted from the 
realized cash flows to calculate the unexpected portion of each cash flow component. 
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 Table 2.8 shows the results of using these alternative definitions of unexpected 
cash flows in model 4 from Table 2.6 (with the additional modification that OpCF is 
also collapsed into one variable). The first column (“Raw”) uses the cash flows as 
reported as the measure of unexpected cash flows, implicitly assuming that all cash 
flows are expected to be zero. With only a couple of exceptions, the results show strong 
similarities among all four approaches. The magnitudes and significance of most of the 
variables are similar across the four approaches, and in each case, cash flows associated 
with an inflow of cash are valued more highly than the corresponding outflow (in 
absolute value terms). The exceptions are with the “Portfolio Average” approach in 
Model 2. A dollar of Divest is worth about 30 cents less than under the other approaches, 
and the increase in value associated with divesting is not statistically very different from 
the decrease in value associated with investing. A dollar of equity payout also decreases 
firm value by 60 to 80 cents more than the same action analyzed using a different 
approach. In this case, too, equity issues and payouts seem to have a similar effect on 
firm value after accounting for the sign of the cash flow. Considering the number of 
coefficients and differences we test in each regression, the differences are relatively 
minor. Therefore we use the raw method to estimate the unexpected cash flows in the 
remainder of Section 2. 
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Table 2.8 
Regressions with Alternative Measures of Unexpected Cash Flows. 
The dependent variable is the FF-25 benchmark-adjusted abnormal return over the 12 months matching each fiscal 
year (AbnRett). “Raw” models treat the full amount of cash flows as unexpected; the other models calculate 
unexpected cash flows as explained in the text and in Table A-1.Variables are defined in detail in Table A-1. All 
explanatory variables (except Lt) are scaled by prior-period market equity. p-values based on robust standard errors 
(clustered by both firm and fiscal year) are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Cashflow-related 
coefficients with the same superscript in the same column do not statistically differ from each other at the 5% level or 
better. 
 
1 2 3 4
Raw PF Avg. ACW(1) ACW(2)
OpCFt Operating cashflow 1.144 1.037 1.135 1.15
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investt Investing cashflow (gross) -0.328
a
-0.256
a
-0.209
a
-0.194
a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestt Divesting cashflow 0.678 0.377
a,b
0.635 0.638
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtIssuet Debt financing-issuance 0.555 0.501
b
0.444 0.458
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtRetiret Debt financing-reduction -0.425 -0.463 -0.320
b
-0.340
b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssuet Equity financing-issuance 1.347 1.278
c
1.363 1.371
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqPayoutt Equity financing-payout -0.106
a
-0.913
c
-0.284
a,b
-0.322
a,b
(0.528) (0.000) (0.084) (0.043)
FinOthert Financing-other 0.501 0.114 0.610 0.711
(0.000) (0.595) (0.000) (0.000)
Et Change in earnings 0.472 0.504 0.459 0.462
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NAt Change in net assets 0.238 0.207 0.255 0.251
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RDt Change in Research & Dev. 0.768 0.733 0.947 1.017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
It Change in interest expense -1.431 -1.775 -1.375 -1.363
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
Dt Change in dividends 1.489 1.290 1.624 1.668
(0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000)
Ct-1 Lagged cash 0.203 0.247 0.192 0.189
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lt Market leverage -0.696 -0.572 -0.688 -0.695
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -0.046 0.086 0.032 0.033
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
N Obs 72,426 72,420 67,962 63,526
Adj. R-squared 0.215 0.196 0.215 0.217
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2.6.3 Distressed or Troubled Firms 
We next turn to questions of differences between subsamples of firms based on 
past accounting performance. Model 4 of Table 2.6 revealed the unexpected result that 
investors in firms with operating cash flow losses value an incremental dollar of cash 
from operating activities much less than do investors in firms with positive operating 
cash flow. In this section we would like to find out if financial distress is a factor in this 
result. Therefore we split the sample based on whether firms have experienced two or 
more years of consecutive operating cash flow losses (referred to as troubled or 
distressed firms) or gains (referred to as stronger firms, or firms further from distress). 
Firms without consecutive gains or losses are dropped from this analysis. In one set of 
regressions (models 1 and 2 of Table 2.9), we determine firms’ distress status by looking 
at the operating cash flows in the contemporaneous year of the regression and the year 
before. In the second set (models 3 and 4), we lag the accounting results one year before 
assigning firms to a gain or loss category. The goal of these regressions is to determine 
whether all types of cash are valued less in troubled or distressed firms. 
Model 1 in Table 2.9 uses the subsample of “gain” firms, and Model 2 uses the 
subsample of “loss” firms, both assigned contemporaneously with the regression. Since 
the sign of OpCF is used to sort firms in these two models, it is not possible to allow for 
different coefficients for OpCF within each subsample based on the sign of the variable. 
OpCF and Invest are the only two cash flow variables whose estimated coefficient is 
higher in magnitude for the stronger firms, but the difference in Invest between the 
subsamples is not statistically significant. The large difference between the OpCF  
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Table 2.9 
Firms with Consecutive Gains and Firms with Consecutive Losses. 
The dependent variable is the FF-25 benchmark-adjusted abnormal return over the 12 months matching each fiscal 
year. Variables are defined in detail in Table A-1. Firms in columns 1 and 3 have two or more years of positive 
operating cash flow; those in columns 2 and 4 have two or more years of negative operating cash flow. In columns 1 
and 2, operating cash flow from years t-1 and t are used to determine the profitability trend. In columns 3 and 4, we 
use years t-2 and t-1. All explanatory variables (except Lt) are scaled by prior-period market equity. p-values based on 
robust standard errors (clustered by both firm and fiscal year) are in parentheses. Cash flow coefficients with the same 
superscript in the same column do not statistically differ from each other at the 5% level or better. 
 
1 2 3 4
Indicator year:
2+ yr gain 2+ yr loss 2+ yr gain 2+ yr loss
OpCFt×1[OpCF>0] 1.416 1.397 1.396
a
0.99
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCFt×1[OpCF≤0] 0.462 -0.371
a
0.459 0.00
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Investt -0.362
a
-0.280
a
0.47 -0.338
a
-0.554
b
0.03
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestt 0.568 0.857
b
0.02 0.545
b
0.897
c
0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtIssuet 0.445 0.844
b
0.00 0.454
b
0.912
c
0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtRetiret -0.355
a
-0.570
c
0.06 -0.360
a
-0.707
b
0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssuet 1.206 1.437 0.02 1.200 1.426
a,d
0.02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqPayoutt -0.238
a
-0.362
a,c
0.74 -0.188
a
-0.908
b,d
0.07
(0.158) (0.223) (0.237) (0.018)
FinOthert 0.301 0.896 0.14 0.316 1.427 0.00
(0.041) (0.010) (0.038) (0.000)
Et 0.522 0.341 0.511 0.369
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NAt 0.245 0.233 0.223 0.270
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RDt 1.146 0.859 0.823 0.951
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
It -1.858 0.152 -1.586 -0.190
(0.000) (0.765) (0.000) (0.713)
Dt 1.467 1.544 1.599 0.970
(0.000) (0.374) (0.000) (0.638)
Ct-1 0.084 0.298 0.084 0.343
(0.042) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000)
Lt -0.785 -0.741 -0.756 -0.810
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (1[OpCF>0]) 0.039 0.146
(0.014) (0.000)
Intercept -0.028 -0.200 -0.074 -0.200
(0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N Obs 50,080 10,252 50,047 10,394
Adj. R-squared 0.228 0.175 0.228 0.200
p -value 
(3=4)
1-year lagContemporaneous p -value 
(1=2)
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coefficients in the two groups is similar to the difference between the two OpCF 
coefficients in Model 4 in Table 2.6. For the three inflow components of the investing 
and financing cash flows, however, there are meaningful differences that point in the 
opposite direction. Divest, DebtIssue and EqIssue all have higher estimated coefficients 
for the more troubled sample of firms than for the subsample of stronger firms. Also, 
within each subsample of firms, the inflow cash flow components always have steeper 
slopes than the matching outflows, and the differences are statistically significant. 
Except for OpCF and Invest, the results indicate that regardless of the source, an 
incremental dollar of cash is valued more highly in poorly performing firms. These 
results also support the idea that cash flow sign asymmetry is not driven entirely by the 
level of distress a firm faces, as inflows and outflows continue to be valued differently in 
both subsamples. The lower valuation of operating cash flows in troubled firms is a 
puzzle that we next address by assigning firms to gain/loss subsamples using lagged 
accounting data. 
In models 3 and 4, we use accounting data from years t-2 and t-1 to assign firms 
to the gain or loss categories. Some of the troubled firms (as of the end of year t-1) are 
now able to generate positive operating cash flows in year t, and some stronger firms 
have lost money on an operating basis in year t. Notably, there is no real difference 
between the stronger and weaker firms in the way that shareholders value a dollar of net 
positive operating cash flow. In both cases, it is valued very highly (at $1.40). A dollar 
of net negative OpCF, however, has a very different value between the groups. For 
stronger firms, an incremental dollar of operating cash flow (or reducing the OpCF loss 
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by $1.00) actually reduces firm value (by $0.37). For the troubled firms, who are now in 
at least their third year of operating losses, reducing the loss by a dollar increases firm 
value by $0.46 (differences are statistically significant). One possible explanation of the 
difference is that managers of stronger firms are more likely to attempt to minimize 
losses by engaging in real earnings management (see, for example, Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997) and Roychowdhury (2006)). Managers who cut R&D, overproduce in 
order to lower the cost of goods sold, or slash discretionary expenses that may be crucial 
to the business may be taking short-term actions to stop losses with long-term negative 
effects on value. Managers of troubled firms may have less opportunity or desire to 
engage in such activities after years of losses, resulting in a higher coefficient on net 
negative operating cash flow. Most of the other coefficients in models 3 and 4 follow the 
general pattern from models 1 and 2: troubled or distressed firms have higher values of 
cash (steeper slopes in relation to firm value) in all cases. Cash inflows also increase 
firm value more than the corresponding outflows decrease firm value.  
We conclude from this table that financial distress is associated with shareholders 
valuing each dollar more highly than in a relatively strong firm, no matter the source of 
the dollar, and we also find that minimizing losses in stronger firms reduces firm value 
on average. Minimizing losses in distressed firms still does not increase value as much 
as increasing profit does. Also, within each subsample firms maintain the same value 
asymmetry with regard to cash increases and decreases, with cash increases attracting a 
value higher in magnitude than the corresponding cash decrease. Finally, comparing the 
results for distressed and stronger firms leads to the conclusion that, among the major 
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classes of frictions we study, agency costs have more of an impact on distressed firms 
than on stronger firms, with the exception of firms experiencing an operating loss. 
2.6.4 Impact of Financial Constraints 
In this section we consider the impact of financial constraints upon shareholders’ 
valuations of the changes in cash, seeking to understand if constraints have a different 
effect than distress. As described in the methods section, we use four different methods 
to classify firms as financially constrained, unconstrained, or neither. In Table 2.10, we 
present the results of comparisons across the constrained and unconstrained subsamples 
for the four schemes. Panel A contains the results for the Whited-Wu and the SA 
indexes, and Panel B contains the results for the Payout Ratio and the Bond Rating 
methods. 
With few exceptions, the marginal values of cash for the financially constrained 
firms are significantly greater than for the unconstrained firms. There is a significant 
difference in valuation of the positive net operating cash flows between the two groups. 
In all cases the constrained subsample exhibits a greater valuation of cash, and this 
difference is significant at the .02 level or better for three of the four constraint 
measures. The lowest difference between the groups for positive OpCF is 16 cents, and 
the highest is 44 cents. Thus financial constraints have an effect on net positive operating 
cash flows that is not apparent with financial distress. Net negative operating cash flows 
tend to be valued somewhere near zero in most cases, even though there are still some 
differences between the unconstrained and the constrained subsamples. The negative and 
significant coefficients for the unconstrained firms using the SA Index or the bond rating  
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Table 2.10 
Financially Unconstrained vs. Constrained Subsamples. 
The dependent variable is the FF-25 benchmark-adjusted abnormal return over the 12 months matching each fiscal 
year. Variables and financial constraint types are defined in Table A-1. All explanatory variables (except Lt) are scaled 
by prior-period market equity. p-values based on robust standard errors (clustered by both firm and fiscal year) are in 
parentheses. Cash flow coefficients with the same superscript in the same column do not statistically differ from each 
other at the 5% level or better. 
 
Panel A: Whited-Wu Index and SA Index Extreme Terciles
1 2 3 4
WW Index 
Unconstr.
WW Index 
Constr.
p -value 
(1=2)
SA Index 
Unconstr.
SA Index 
Constr.
p -value 
(3=4)
OpCFt×1[OpCF>0] 1.261
b
1.419
a
0.10 1.289 1.512
a
0.02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCFt×1[OpCF≤0] -0.150
a
0.218 0.00 -0.443
a
0.256 0.00
(0.215) (0.031) (0.000) (0.020)
Investt -0.219
a
-0.356
b
0.09 -0.211
a
-0.414
b
0.02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestt 0.488 0.671
c
0.09 0.503 0.641
c
0.24
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtIssuet 0.372 0.663
c
0.00 0.395 0.736
c
0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtRetiret -0.271
a
-0.496
d
0.00 -0.287
a
-0.540
b
0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssuet 1.053
b
1.393
a
0.00 1.007 1.412
a,d
0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqPayoutt -0.071
a
-0.637
b,d
0.01 -0.139
a
-0.950
b,d
0.00
(0.668) (0.013) (0.367) (0.001)
FinOthert 0.231 0.631 0.17 0.206 0.915 0.03
(0.068) (0.010) (0.129) (0.001)
Et 0.485 0.401 0.454 0.434
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NAt 0.119 0.319 0.113 0.348
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RDt 0.758 0.803 0.329 1.094
(0.008) (0.000) (0.382) (0.000)
It -1.078 -0.932 -1.265 -0.757
(0.003) (0.049) (0.000) (0.131)
Dt 1.193 2.010 0.999 3.758
(0.025) (0.008) (0.069) (0.000)
Ct-1 0.097 0.209 0.125 0.215
(0.035) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Lt -0.793 -0.736 -0.816 -0.801
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (1[OpCF>0]) -0.009 0.099 -0.013 0.107
(0.673) (0.000) (0.444) (0.000)
Intercept 0.003 -0.186 0.009 -0.182
(0.904) (0.000) (0.649) (0.000)
N Obs 26,410 21,681 27,187 21,286
Adj. R-squared 0.222 0.223 0.238 0.224
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Table 2.10 Continued 
 
Panel B: Payout Ratio and Bond Rating Measures
5 6 7 8
Payout Ratio 
Unconstr.
Payout Ratio 
Constr.
p -value 
(5=6)
Bond Rating 
Unconstr.
Bond Rating 
Constr.
p -value 
(7=8)
OpCFt×1[OpCF>0] 1.096
a,b
1.535
a
0.00 1.241 1.426 0.02
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCFt×1[OpCF≤0] 0.098 0.047 0.64 -0.297
a,b
0.068 0.01
(0.345) (0.640) (0.029) (0.438)
Investt -0.212 -0.444 0.00 -0.193
a
-0.354
a
0.01
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divestt 0.439
c
0.806 0.00 0.502 0.668
b
0.06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtIssuet 0.457
c
0.643 0.00 0.461 0.595
b
0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DebtRetiret -0.385 -0.520 0.03 -0.322
b
-0.476
c
0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssuet 1.080
a
1.359
a,b
0.01 0.877 1.174 0.01
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqPayoutt 1.046
b
-2.295
b
0.00 -0.256
a,b
-0.325
a,c
0.58
(0.000) (0.010) (0.100) (0.076)
FinOthert 0.319 0.832 0.06 0.241 0.425 0.35
(0.134) (0.000) (0.158) (0.003)
Et 0.359 0.433 0.354 0.448
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NAt 0.169 0.294 0.057 0.274
(0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000)
RDt 0.684 0.862 -0.409 0.799
(0.002) (0.000) (0.401) (0.000)
It -1.169 -1.338 -1.145 -1.251
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
Dt 2.179 -0.680 0.243 1.749
(0.000) (0.514) (0.669) (0.000)
Ct-1 0.078 0.197 0.262 0.183
(0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lt -0.615 -0.802 -0.980 -0.826
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dummy (1[OpCF>0]) 0.069 0.099 -0.023 0.070
(0.000) (0.000) (0.364) (0.000)
Intercept -0.208 -0.136 0.084 -0.114
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
N Obs 23,609 26,246 17,253 44,059
Adj. R-squared 0.193 0.244 0.281 0.243
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methods imply a real earnings management explanation similar to the one for “gain” 
firms mentioned previously. 
With regard to the gross components of the investing and financing cash flows, 
the differences in valuation between the two kinds of firms are similar under the 
different constraint schemes. Decreases in cash (Invest, DebtRetire, and EqPayout) 
lower firm value more in constrained firms than in unconstrained firms. The differences 
are usually statistically significant, and the significant differences range from 14 to 81 
cents per dollar of cash.
18
 In a similar way, increases in cash (Divest, DebtIssue, and 
EqIssue) increase firm value more in constrained firms than in unconstrained firms. The 
differences for debt and equity issues are all statistically significant, and they range from 
13 to 41 cents per dollar of cash. These results indicate that a marginal dollar of any kind 
of cash is more highly valued by the investors of constrained firms. 
The differences in value between the constrained and unconstrained firms with 
regard to Invest are an unexpected result. Jensen (1986) posits that, due to agency 
problems, the existence of free cash flow in a firm can lead to suboptimal investment. If 
this principle were the overriding factor in the valuation of investment cash flows, we 
would expect investment by unconstrained firms to enhance firm value less (or destroy 
firm value more) than investment by constrained firms, assuming unconstrained firms 
have more free cash flow. Instead we find a more negative coefficient on Invest for 
constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. This means that $1.00 of investing by 
                                                 
18
 We ignore the $3.34 difference for EqPayout for the Payout Ratio method because there are only 293 
observations out of over 26,000 in the constrained subsample in which EqPayout is nonzero. 
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constrained firms lowers firm value by 14 to 23 cents more than the same dollar of 
investment at an unconstrained firm would. Table 2.7 showed also that this effect was 
concentrated in the third investing tercile since for the first tercile, investing by 
constrained firms added more value than the same investment by unconstrained firms. In 
that table, investing by constrained firms (in the third tercile) is associated with a firm 
value decrease of 31 cents more than the same dollar investment at an unconstrained 
firm. Although agency costs may still be important for unconstrained firms, the results 
suggest that agency costs may affect investment value more for firms facing financial 
constraints.  
Next we consider the differences in coefficient estimates within each subsample. 
In five of eight subsamples, in both constrained and unconstrained firms, net positive 
OpCF is valued statistically equivalently to EqIssue with a significance threshold of .05. 
This was also the case in the base model (Model 4 in Table 2.6). It appears that firms 
needing to raise funds could tap the equity markets to receive the same benefits as they 
would if they used internally-generated operating income. In order to try to remove the 
possible effect of stock price run-ups on this result, we test this result in different ways 
(all untabulated). In two regressions, a lagged return term is included, and in one of 
those cases it is also interacted with the EqIssue term. Neither of these qualitatively 
changes the prior results. We also use quarterly data and rerun the regressions. The data 
are much noisier at the quarterly level, but OpCF is still valued statistically equivalently 
to EqIssue much of the time. 
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In many cases Divest and DebtIssue are also statistically equivalent, implying 
that constrained firms that need to raise cash can do so via divestitures or outside debt 
financing at approximately the same cost. In other cases Invest, DebtRetire, EqPayout, 
and the negative realizations of OpCF are statistically equivalent or near the 
conventional .05 threshold. In almost all cases, the gross cash flow component that 
represents a cash inflow adds more value to the firm than its matching outflow 
component takes away from firm value. For example, in Model 7, $1.00 of Divest adds 
50 cents to firm value, while $1.00 of Invest takes away 19 cents of firm value. The only 
exceptions to this rule are with equity cash flows in constrained firms using the SA 
Index or the payout ratio measures: in these firms, using conventional statistical cutoffs, 
cash raised through equity issues is valued approximately the same as cash paid out 
through stock repurchases or dividends. Another exception is with unconstrained firms 
using the payout ratio measure: $1.00 of equity issuance adds to firm value 
approximately as much as $1.00 of equity repurchases/dividends subtracts from firm 
value. Other than these findings, there appear to be no systematic differences between 
constrained and unconstrained firms when it comes to differences in the values of 
coefficients within subsamples. 
These results provide support for the proposition that the existence of financial 
constraints is not responsible for cash flow sign asymmetry. In almost all cases, investors 
still place a significantly higher value on positive cash flows than on negative ones. 
Also, when considering our semi-quantitative predictions about the effect frictions might 
have upon values of cash, it appears that financially constrained firms tend to be more 
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affected by agency costs than are unconstrained firms. Net positive operating cash flows 
point to a larger effect of information asymmetry upon constrained firms, since increases 
in cash holdings stemming from operating activities are valued so much higher in 
constrained firms. 
2.7 Discussion 
In this essay, we contribute to the literature on the value of cash holdings by 
showing that the source of the dollar is important to investors in valuing the dollar. 
Disaggregating the change in cash into its constituent parts provides us with a richer 
understanding of how investors value the firm’s cash holdings. Even before 
disaggregating the change in cash into its constituent cash flows, we find that net 
decreases in cash are valued asymmetrically from net increases: an incremental dollar of 
cash conditional on an overall decline in the cash balance is worth only $0.41, but an 
incremental dollar conditional on an overall cash increase is worth $1.32. 
The range in valuations of an incremental dollar of cash is large: a dollar increase 
in cash holdings attributable to operating activities is valued at $1.27, a dollar increase 
attributable to financing is worth $0.80, and a dollar increase attributable to investing is 
worth $0.46. Allowing for the possibility of asymmetric valuations based on the sign of 
the cash flow produces an even wider variation: an incremental dollar of cash due to net 
positive operating cash flow is valued at $1.40, whereas an incremental dollar for a firm 
with net negative operating cash flow is valued at a statistically insignificant $0.10. 
We also study the impact of financial distress and financial constraints on the 
value of cash. Financially troubled or constrained firms experience more sensitive 
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reactions to virtually all components of a firm’s change in cash. In the most extreme 
case, investors of distressed firms value a dollar of cash from debt financing 46 cents 
higher than they would in a relatively strong firm (the valuation is approximately twice 
as much in a distressed firm). A dollar coming from net positive operating cash flow is 
valued up to 44 cents higher within a financially constrained firm as opposed to an 
unconstrained firm. Also, within each of these subsamples, the differences between 
many of the cash flow coefficients continue to be statistically significant, and there 
continue to be asymmetric values of cash depending on the sign of the cash flow.  
Many of the marginal values of cash are most consistent with agency costs 
having an impact on their value. To the extent that cash holdings sourced from operating 
activities are valued above $1.00, information asymmetry appears to be at work. Taxes 
may only have a second-order affect. Other factors such as transaction or adjustment 
costs may also contribute to the different marginal values of cash holdings that we 
document. The results enrich our understanding of how investors value firms’ cash 
holdings. 
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3. EXPLANATIONS FOR DIVERGING VALUES OF CASH 
3.1 Introduction to Section 3 
In Section 2 we demonstrate that there are significant differences in the marginal 
value of cash depending on its source. In Section 3 we further investigate why 
differences exist among the values of cash. We find that prior sources and uses of cash 
provide important information to shareholders about likely future uses and sources of 
cash. Our results show that certain categories of cash outlays are significantly related to 
specific types of cash inflows from two or three years prior, suggesting that the source of 
cash informs investors about the likely use of cash. Similarly, we also find that certain 
prior uses of cash tell investors something about future uses of cash. Extending the logic 
further, we find that the sources of cash inflows today help explain variations in the 
sources of future cash inflows.  
Extant literature shows that the likely use of cash can affect its value as viewed 
by shareholders (Faulkender and Wang (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)). The 
likely use of cash provides one rationale for different sources of cash being valued 
differently. For example, we find that $1.00 of operating cash flow in the prior year is 
linked to 3.6 cents of incremental spending on capital expenditures and 6.4 cents of 
R&D in the current year. A dollar of debt issuance in the prior year, by contrast, is 
related to 2 cents less spending on capital expenditures and 1.3 cents less R&D in the 
current year. Focusing on prior uses of cash, $1.00 of R&D spending last year is 
associated with 36 cents less spending on acquisitions in the current year, while $1.00 of 
R&D spending in the prior year results in over 90 cents of R&D spending in the current 
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year. Finally, prior sources of cash are also informative: operating cash flow today can 
provide information about operating cash flows even five years into the future. 
Some of the literature on investment-cash flow sensitivities explores the 
intertemporal relationships among cash flows and investment. Gatchev, Pulvino, and 
Tarhan (2010) emphasize that financial policies are (contemporaneously) interdependent 
as well as intertemporal. Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011) and Lewellen and Lewellen 
(2011) analyze the impact of lagged cashflow on investment, finding that cashflow may 
have a more significant effect on future investment than on contemporaneous 
investment. Almeida and Campello (2010) note that investment and financing decisions 
are linked, especially within financially constrained firms. Even more than other firms, 
these firms are concerned about being able to fund investments in the future, modifying 
their activities today in order to maximize the firm’s future flexibility. Finally, in a study 
of the reasons for issuing equity, Kim and Weisbach (2008) determine that many firms 
spend a large proportion of their externally raised cash on R&D and capital expenditures 
over the next 1-4 years. 
These studies and others show that some firm behavior can best be understood in 
light of these intertemporal relationships among categories of cashflow and investment. 
We connect firms’ actions and outcomes over time to the expectations of investors in 
order to explain why different sources of cash attract such different values. 
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3.2 Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Future Uses of Cash Linked to Prior Sources of Cash 
Beginning with the idea that investors may value different sources of cash in 
different ways because of what the sources reveal about the likely future uses of cash, 
we form our first null hypothesis: 
H1: The future uses of cash are unrelated to the sources of the cash. 
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) find that higher operating cash 
flows tend to be distributed to shareholders via dividends, whereas one-time non-
operating cash flows are likely to be distributed through share repurchases. Faulkender 
and Wang (2006) show that cash holdings that are likely to be used for repurchases are 
more highly valued than cash holdings that are likely to be distributed as dividends. 
Using these findings, and assuming that divesting cash flows are likely to be one-time 
events, we formulate two alternative hypotheses: 
H1a: Increases in cash related to operating cash flows lead to dividend increases 
instead of share repurchases. 
H1b: Increases in cash related to divesting cash flows lead to share repurchases 
instead of dividend increases. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) study the agency costs of debt and show that 
managers may have an incentive to reallocate wealth from the debtholders to the 
shareholders. Debtholders rationally anticipate this incentive and assume the worst case 
when deciding the amount they will pay and the covenants they will require in order to 
purchase debt securities. Opler and Titman (1994) find that highly levered firms 
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engaging in substantial R&D activities suffer the most when downturns occur. These and 
other papers focus on how the nature of an investment project may help determine the 
source of capital for the project. If debt is most useful for firms with more stable 
operations and less valuable growth options, then this leads to additional alternative 
hypotheses: 
H1c: Increases in cash from debt issues lead to lower future acquisitions and 
R&D. 
H1d: Increases in cash from equity issues lead to higher future acquisitions and 
R&D. 
Almeida and Campello (2010) conclude that, especially for constrained firms, 
internal and external financing can be complements rather than substitutes. The 
additional costs of external financing are not as important to these firms as is the 
possibility of constraints affecting investment in either the current or some future period. 
Constrained firms attempt to minimize future as well as current constraints. This insight 
leads to the last alternative hypothesis: 
H1e: Increases in cash within financially constrained firms lead to future 
increases in investment within those firms. 
To the extent that constrained firms look to future investing needs in order to 
decide how to raise and preserve cash today more so than unconstrained firms do, this 
could help explain the larger magnitudes of the values of cash assigned by investors of 
constrained firms. Each dollar of cash inflow for a constrained firm would have greater 
implications for likely future uses of cash, affecting its value today more significantly. 
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3.2.2 Future Uses of Cash Linked to Prior Uses of Cash 
 Just as prior sources of cash may provide information about future uses of cash, 
prior uses of cash can be seen as negative sources of cash that may also provide 
information about future uses. The null hypothesis is therefore: 
 H2: The future uses of cash are unrelated to prior uses of cash. 
 If uses of cash are serially correlated, then the use of cash in period t provides 
information to investors about the likely use of cash in period t+1. One alternative 
hypothesis is then: 
 H2a: Decreases in cash associated with a specific use of cash are positively 
autocorrelated. 
 Firms making acquisitions may be signaling that they do not have the assets in 
place to pursue a certain line of business and are instead growing inorganically. In 
contrast, firms making investments in R&D and/or capital expenditures are possibly 
committing themselves to a path of organic growth. Since investment plans may take 
years to complete and firms must limit the number of projects they can undertake during 
a period of time, uses of cash associated with one of these approaches may inform 
investors about likely future uses of cash. Two alternative hypotheses are therefore: 
 H2b: Decreases in cash due to acquisitions are associated with lower future 
R&D expense and/or capital expenditures. 
 H2c: Decreases in cash due to R&D expense and/or capital expenditures are 
associated with lower future acquisitions. 
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3.2.3 Future Sources of Cash Linked to Prior Sources of Cash 
Current sources of cash may also reveal information to investors about future 
sources of cash. For example, the level of operating cash flows may indicate the current 
and future productivity of existing assets; higher productivity of the firm’s assets could 
translate to higher future operating cash flows. These anticipated future operating cash 
flows can then affect the value of cash today. The null hypothesis is therefore: 
H3: The future sources of cash are unrelated to the prior sources of cash. 
If sources of cash are serially correlated, then sources of cash in period t provide 
information to investors about possible sources of cash in period t+1. One alternative 
hypothesis is then: 
H3a: Increases in cash associated with a specific source of cash are positively 
autocorrelated. 
3.3 Methods and Data 
 In order to test these hypotheses, we perform pooled OLS, Tobit, and logit 
regressions. The dependent variables are sources or uses of cash in the form of 
continuous or binary variables, and the explanatory variables are contemporaneous and 
various lags of sources and/or uses of cash. Since the firm’s investment opportunity set 
is a relevant factor in determining the firm’s uses (and sources) of cash, we also control 
for investment opportunities with the lagged market-to-book assets ratio. 
One specification used to test H1 is the following: 
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 (3.1) 
where Use is replaced by a different use of cash in each model, the other variables are 
the same ones defined and described in Section 2 and in Table A-1, and all variables are 
scaled by the lagged book value of assets (total assets at t-1). All variables are trimmed 
(deleted) below the first and above the 99
th
 percentiles. As in Section 2, standard errors 
are clustered at both the firm and year levels. 
The five uses of cash in the study are acquisitions, capital expenditures, stock 
repurchases, change in dividends, and research and development expense (R&D). If the 
variable for the use of cash is missing, the observation is not used in any regression 
requiring that use of cash. We use a Tobit model as an added specification in some cases 
where acquisitions, stock repurchases, or dividend changes are the dependent variable. 
In most firm-years, there are zero acquisitions, stock repurchases, or dividend changes, 
so the observable variable can be thought of as left censored at zero. OLS models with 
censored dependent variables provide inconsistent estimates, but by assuming the 
existence of a latent dependent variable, the Tobit model overcomes this problem. 
The sources of cash we focus on are the four listed on the right side of equation 
(3.1): operating cash flow, divesting cash flow, debt issuance, and equity issuance. In 
some tables we augment the set of explanatory variables by estimating coefficients for 
each lag of each variable separately, and we add additional lags (up to t-5). For the logit 
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regressions, the dependent variable takes the value of one if the underlying variable of 
interest is in the top quartile of the observations within the firm’s 3-digit SIC code. 
Otherwise the dependent variable is zero. This method ensures that differences among 
industries do not drive the results.  
Table 3.1 contains summary statistics. The number of observations is lower than 
in Section 2 because in most cases at least two lags of each variable are required in order 
to remain in the sample. Most means and standard deviations are smaller than those of 
the sample used in Section 2. We use the maximum sample size for each regression, so 
the number of observations in each model changes depending on the specific variables 
included in the regression. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Uses of Cash Linked to Sources 
We first test the null hypothesis that future uses of cash have no relation to prior 
sources. Table 3.2 shows the results of regressions based on equation (3.1), with five 
different uses of cash regressed onto contemporaneous and lagged sources of cash. 
Model 1 reveals that debt issuance one to two years prior results in a smaller amount of 
acquisitions, but equity issuance can precede higher amounts of acquisitions. The 
coefficient of -0.048 on lagged debt issuance can be interpreted to mean that for every 
$1.00 in debt issuance in the prior two-year period, acquisitions will decrease by 4.8 
cents. Since acquisitions are typically much lower than debt issuance, this is an 
economically meaningful effect. Uses of cash for acquisitions are positively 
autocorrelated in a significant way, as are all of the other uses of cash in the table. Since 
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Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics. 
This table provides summary statistics for the variables described in the text for the period 1987-2011. Variables are 
defined in detail in Table A-1. All variables are converted to real 2010 dollars and then deflated by the lagged book 
value of assets. Variables have each been trimmed at the 1% tails of each distribution. 
 
 
  
Variable Description Mean
1st 
Quartile Median
3rd 
Quartile SD N
OpCFt Operating cashflow 0.0610 0.0152 0.0796 0.1392 0.1471 67,490
OpCF Aggregate lags 1-2 0.0959 0.0366 0.1459 0.2418 0.3008 67,490
Divestt Divesting cashflow 0.0122 0.0000 0.0006 0.0074 0.0326 67,490
Divest Aggregate lags 1-2 0.0255 0.0000 0.0033 0.0199 0.0654 67,490
DebtIssuet Debt financing-issuance 0.0999 0.0000 0.0141 0.1078 0.1992 67,490
DebtIssue Aggregate lags 1-2 0.1696 0.0000 0.0727 0.2195 0.2863 67,490
EqIssuet Equity financing-issuance 0.0441 0.0001 0.0035 0.0166 0.1470 67,490
EqIssue Aggregate lags 1-2 0.0732 0.0012 0.0106 0.0480 0.1799 67,490
Acqt Acquisitions 0.0239 0.0000 0.0000 0.0083 0.0698 63,867
Acq Aggregate lags 1-2 0.0386 0.0000 0.0000 0.0405 0.0776 61,470
CAPXt Capital expenditures 0.0611 0.0198 0.0403 0.0773 0.0663 66,163
CAPX Aggregate lags 1-2 0.1162 0.0466 0.0861 0.1519 0.1036 65,526
Repurcht Stock repurchases 0.0130 0.0000 0.0000 0.0079 0.0312 62,313
Repurch Aggregate lags 1-2 0.0239 0.0000 0.0000 0.0218 0.0519 60,176
Dt Change in dividends 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0045 66,012
D Aggregate lags 1-2 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0066 59,786
RDt Research & development 0.0733 0.0060 0.0360 0.1057 0.0964 41,311
RD Aggregate lags 1-2 0.1472 0.0132 0.0709 0.1998 0.2167 40,530
MTBt-1 Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 1.8253 1.0602 1.4070 2.0789 1.3027 66,686
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Table 3.2 
Regressions of Uses of Cash onto Aggregate Lagged Sources. 
Models 2, 5, and 7 are estimated via Tobit models; all others use pooled OLS. All variables are defined in Table A-1 
and are scaled by lagged book assets. p-values based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) 
are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable:
Acqui-
sitions
Acqui-
sitions CAPX
Stk 
Repurch
Stk 
Repurch
Change in 
Divs
Change in 
Divs R&D
OpCF: contemporaneous 0.061*** 0.136*** 0.064*** 0.022*** 0.051*** 0.003*** 0.012*** -0.083***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCF: aggregate lags 1-2 0.003 0.056*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.040*** 0 0.009*** 0.071***
(0.210) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.408) (0.000) (0.000)
Divest (+): contemp. 0.049*** 0.093*** 0.063*** 0.024*** 0.045*** -0.001** 0.002 -0.063***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.227) (0.000)
Divest (+): agg. lags 1-2 -0.008* -0.026* -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0 0 -0.049***
(0.099) (0.093) (0.493) (0.612) (0.825) (0.182) (0.840) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): contemp. 0.140*** 0.244*** 0.057*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0 0.001** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.039) (0.295) (0.022) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): agg. lags 1-2 -0.048*** -0.095*** -0.020*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.012***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): contemp. 0.039*** 0.065*** 0.051*** 0.002 -0.011*** 0.000** -0.006*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.277) (0.004) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): agg. lags 1-2 0.005** -0.015* 0.018*** 0.001 -0.009*** 0 -0.014*** 0.030***
(0.035) (0.073) (0.000) (0.420) (0.009) (0.155) (0.000) (0.000)
Dep. Var: agg. lags 1-2 0.164*** 0.500*** 0.362*** 0.241*** 0.402*** 0.070*** 0.299*** 0.387***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.003*** -0.118*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.040*** -0.000*** -0.009*** 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.276) (0.176) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.999)
N Obs 58,829 58,829 64,235 57,653 57,653 58,311 58,311 39,442
Adj. R
2
0.161 0.461 0.234 0.031 0.763
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66% of the firm-year observations in model 1 involve zero acquisitions, we use a Tobit 
model in column 2 to check our results. Although most of the signs and significance are 
the same as in model 1, model 2 now shows that lagged operating cash flow from the 
prior two years is positively related to acquisition activity, and lagged equity issuance is 
weakly negatively related to it. 
Model 3 shows some of the same inferences for capital expenditures that are 
observed in model 2 for acquisitions. One different finding is that equity issuance in 
prior years is positively related to future capital expenditures. In model 4, operating cash 
flow from prior years is positively associated with stock repurchases in the future, and 
model 5 (using a Tobit model) adds the result that earlier equity issues are associated 
with lower future stock repurchases. In contrast to model 6 using OLS, model 7 (Tobit) 
suggests that operating cash flow from prior years is positively related to future dividend 
increases. Model 8 shows statistically strong relations between R&D and all lagged 
sources of cash flow. Lagged operating cash flow and equity issuance are positively 
related to R&D, while lagged divesting and debt issuance are negatively related to R&D. 
The point estimate of 0.071 for lagged operating cash flow means that a one standard 
deviation increase in lagged operating cash flow is associated with a 29% increase in 
mean R&D, or a 59% increase in median R&D.
19
 
In Table 3.3, we disaggregate the lagged sources of cash and add lags up to t-5 to 
the model. As in the previous table, we use both OLS and Tobit models to analyze  
                                                 
19
 For the impact on mean R&D: (0.30×0.071)/0.0733=0.29; for median R&D: (0.30×0.071)/0.036=0.59. 
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Table 3.3 
Regressions of Uses of Cash onto Five Lags of Sources. 
Models 2, 5, and 7 are estimated via Tobit models; all others use pooled OLS. All variables are defined in Table A-1 
and are scaled by lagged book assets. p-values based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) 
are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable:
Acqui-
sitions
Acqui-
sitions CAPX
Stk 
Repurch
Stk 
Repurch
Change in 
Divs
Change in 
Divs R&D
OpCF: contemporaneous 0.069*** 0.143*** 0.057*** 0.023*** 0.052*** 0.002*** 0.009*** -0.037***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCF: 1 lag(s) 0.007 0.059*** 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.067*** 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.064***
(0.116) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCF: 2 lag(s) 0.001 0.031*** -0.005 0.003 0.020*** -0.000* 0.002*** 0.011**
(0.679) (0.006) (0.174) (0.334) (0.000) (0.084) (0.001) (0.028)
OpCF: 3 lag(s) -0.001 0.007 -0.008*** -0.005*** -0.007* 0 0.002** -0.004
(0.809) (0.582) (0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.148) (0.039) (0.394)
OpCF: 4 lag(s) -0.006** -0.020** -0.008*** -0.002** -0.007** -0.000* 0.003*** -0.008
(0.018) (0.038) (0.000) (0.029) (0.044) (0.052) (0.000) (0.167)
OpCF: 5 lag(s) -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.007** 0 0.004*** 0.001
(0.780) (0.846) (0.233) (0.384) (0.011) (0.590) (0.000) (0.920)
Divest (+): contemp. 0.066*** 0.144*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.049*** -0.001 0.002 -0.052***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139) (0.146) (0.000)
Divest (+): 1 lag(s) -0.009 -0.032 0.012 0.015*** 0.033*** 0 0.001 -0.036***
(0.250) (0.221) (0.213) (0.000) (0.001) (0.893) (0.393) (0.004)
Divest (+): 2 lag(s) -0.019** -0.049* -0.017** -0.013*** -0.014* -0.001*** -0.001 0
(0.022) (0.079) (0.016) (0.000) (0.087) (0.003) (0.600) (0.995)
Divest (+): 3 lag(s) 0.001 -0.025 -0.007 -0.006 -0.016* 0 -0.001 -0.01
(0.948) (0.325) (0.108) (0.186) (0.081) (0.691) (0.613) (0.118)
Divest (+): 4 lag(s) 0.004 -0.011 -0.002 -0.010** -0.029*** 0 0 0.003
(0.632) (0.553) (0.607) (0.021) (0.000) (0.189) (0.673) (0.586)
Divest (+): 5 lag(s) 0.005 0.019 0.008 0 -0.008 0 0 -0.014**
(0.690) (0.412) (0.431) (0.969) (0.270) (0.489) (0.852) (0.030)
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Table 3.3 Continued 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable:
Acqui-
sitions
Acqui-
sitions CAPX
Stk 
Repurch
Stk 
Repurch
Change in 
Divs
Change in 
Divs R&D
DebtIssue (+): contemp. 0.163*** 0.274*** 0.046*** 0.003** 0.002 0 0 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) (0.351) (0.630) (0.465) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): 1 lag(s) -0.082*** -0.151*** -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.013***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.090) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): 2 lag(s) -0.027*** -0.054*** -0.013*** -0.003** -0.003 0 -0.002*** -0.005*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) (0.191) (0.232) (0.000) (0.057)
DebtIssue (+): 3 lag(s) -0.018*** -0.037*** -0.008*** 0 -0.001 0 0 -0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.965) (0.881) (0.471) (0.540) (0.339)
DebtIssue (+): 4 lag(s) -0.004 -0.015* 0 0.001 -0.001 0 0 -0.004**
(0.214) (0.082) (0.967) (0.608) (0.621) (0.399) (0.567) (0.036)
DebtIssue (+): 5 lag(s) -0.008*** -0.031*** -0.001 0.001 -0.005** 0 0 -0.005**
(0.006) (0.000) (0.342) (0.450) (0.025) (0.346) (0.205) (0.016)
EqIssue (+): contemp. 0.049*** 0.082*** 0.046*** 0 -0.019*** 0 -0.004*** 0.040***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.883) (0.000) (0.769) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): 1 lag(s) 0.018*** 0.019 0.033*** 0.003 -0.011* 0 -0.008*** 0.023***
(0.001) (0.221) (0.000) (0.356) (0.092) (0.431) (0.000) (0.001)
EqIssue (+): 2 lag(s) 0.003 -0.031** 0 0.002 -0.01 0 -0.014*** -0.003
(0.392) (0.028) (0.886) (0.172) (0.130) (0.990) (0.000) (0.630)
EqIssue (+): 3 lag(s) -0.005 -0.051*** -0.012*** -0.002 -0.019*** 0 -0.016*** -0.005
(0.296) (0.001) (0.000) (0.355) (0.001) (0.491) (0.000) (0.413)
EqIssue (+): 4 lag(s) -0.004 -0.045*** -0.011*** -0.001 -0.015*** 0 -0.017*** -0.012*
(0.139) (0.001) (0.000) (0.616) (0.009) (0.159) (0.000) (0.078)
EqIssue (+): 5 lag(s) -0.006*** -0.042*** -0.007** 0 -0.013*** 0 -0.015*** -0.008*
(0.004) (0.000) (0.014) (0.875) (0.008) (0.519) (0.000) (0.088)
Dependent Var.: 1 lag(s) 0.182*** 0.522*** 0.687*** 0.372*** 0.542*** 0.115*** 0.329*** 0.915***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dependent Var.: 2 lag(s) 0.125*** 0.373*** 0.039*** 0.094*** 0.162*** 0.02 0.197*** -0.045
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.324) (0.000) (0.281)
Dependent Var.: 3 lag(s) 0.073*** 0.262*** 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.111*** -0.014 0.096*** -0.013
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.388) (0.000) (0.570)
Dependent Var.: 4 lag(s) 0.051*** 0.197*** 0.051*** 0.027*** 0.062*** 0.006 0.123*** -0.015
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.594) (0.000) (0.285)
Dependent Var.: 5 lag(s) 0.034*** 0.136*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.051*** -0.020* 0.051** 0.035
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.005) (0.000) (0.096) (0.011) (0.136)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.001** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005***
(0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.003** -0.112*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.035*** -0.000*** -0.007*** -0.001
(0.016) (0.000) (0.290) (0.023) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.502)
N Obs 33,267 33,267 39,379 33,170 33,170 35,659 35,659 23,847
Adj. R
2
0.183 0.540 0.288 0.038 0.832
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acquisitions, stock repurchases, and dividend changes. The Tobit model in column 2 
shows that operating cash flows from up to two years prior have a positive (and 
significant) effect on acquisitions. In models 1-3, debt issues from three to four years 
prior are related negatively to acquisitions and capital expenditures. Past equity issues 
have a mixed effect on acquisitions, but equity issues the previous year are positively 
related to capital expenditures. Models 4 and 5 show that proceeds from divesting from 
the prior year are partially paid out in the form of stock repurchases. No such relation 
exists in models 6 and 7 for lagged divesting and dividend changes. These results 
support alternative hypothesis H1b. The fact that each of the five lags of operating cash 
flow in model 7 has a positive and significant relation to dividend increases lends some 
support to alternative hypothesis H1a. Finally, model 8 reveals that operating cash flows 
from both one and two years before are positively and significantly related to R&D. 
The results from logit regressions are in Table 3.4. The dependent variables take 
the value one if the firm’s use of cash is in the top quartile for its industry; otherwise the 
dependent variable is zero. These results provide qualitatively similar results to those in 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. Defining the indicator variables by industry confirms that the 
prior results are not driven solely by industry effects. 
Summarizing the results, we reject the null hypothesis that future uses of cash are 
unrelated to the sources of cash. There are often statistically and economically 
significant relations between lagged sources of cash and the uses of cash. In some cases 
there is information in cash flows up to three to five years prior to the use of cash. For 
alternative hypothesis H1a, we do not find much evidence that lagged operating cash  
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Table 3.4 
Logit Regressions of Cash Use Indicators onto Aggregate Lagged Sources. 
The dependent variable equals one if the underlying variable is in the top quartile of all observations in the firm’s 3-
digit SIC code. All variables are defined in Table A-1, and all independent variables are scaled by lagged book assets. 
p-values based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent Variable:
1[Acq in 
top 
industry 
quartile]
1[CAPX 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
1[Stk 
Repurch 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
1[∆Divs 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
1[R&D in 
top 
industry 
quartile]
OpCF: contemporaneous 1.339*** 2.540*** 1.658*** 2.755*** -1.086***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCF: aggregate lags 1-2 1.037*** 1.485*** 1.697*** 2.099*** 2.439***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divest (+): contemp. 0.19 1.637*** 1.211** 0.555 -6.427***
(0.676) (0.004) (0.013) (0.311) (0.000)
Divest (+): aggregate lags 1-2 -0.329 -0.426 -0.038 -0.182 -3.639***
(0.247) (0.195) (0.859) (0.507) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): contemp. 2.310*** 1.943*** -0.025 0.191*** 1.175***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.757) (0.008) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 -1.092*** -0.851*** -0.459*** -0.270*** -0.845***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): contemp. 0.323*** 1.833*** -1.073*** -2.225*** 1.346***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 -0.108 0.936*** -0.517*** -4.645*** 0.814***
(0.463) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.002)
Continuous Dep Var: aggregate lags 1-2 7.756*** 14.253*** 16.699***107.492***21.581***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.071*** 0.151*** 0.087*** 0.032 0.259***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.284) (0.000)
Intercept -1.826*** -4.152*** -1.806*** -1.853*** -6.081***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N Obs 58,829 64,235 57,653 58,311 39,442
Pseudo R
2
0.104 0.315 0.159 0.139 0.650
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flows are positively related more to dividend increases as opposed to share repurchases. 
There is some support for H1b only in Table 3.3: only there do share repurchases appear 
to be positively related to prior divesting. Hypothesis H1c finds support in all three 
tables discussed so far, as lagged debt issuance is negatively related to both acquisitions 
and R&D. There is some support for the R&D prediction of H1d in all tables, but 
acquisitions are not always significantly linked to lagged equity issuance in a positive 
way. 
 The intertemporal linkages among cash flows uncovered so far provide some 
explanations for why cash from different sources can be valued so differently. For 
example, recall from Section 2 that $1.00 of cash stemming from debt issuance is worth 
56 cents (in model 4 of Table 2.6), which is much higher than the amount of zero 
predicted in a frictionless environment. A dollar used for investing lowers firm value by 
39 cents (acquisitions are part of investing but are not analyzed separately in Section 2). 
The results in Section 3 demonstrate that lagged debt issuance is related to lower 
acquisitions for the next few years. If acquisitions can lower firm value, and increased 
debt hampers future acquisitions, then a dollar of debt provides additional value to the 
firm by limiting future (value-destroying) acquisitions. In untabulated results, we split 
the sample into the lowest and highest terciles of investing activity and separately 
perform regressions similar to those in Table 3.3. These results shed further light on this 
connection: lagged debt issuance is most negatively associated with future acquisitions 
for firms in the third investing tercile, the firms for which investing lowers firm value 
significantly (shown in Table 2.7). 
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Recall also that $1.00 sourced from operating cash flow is valued highly at 
$1.40. Lagged operating cash flow is positively related to future acquisitions only for 
firms in the first investing tercile, those for which investing contributes relatively more 
value to the firm. Therefore these results help explain why both debt issuance and 
operating cash flows can be valued so highly, as they respectively decrease the 
likelihood of value-destroying acquisitions and increase the likelihood of value-
enhancing acquisitions. 
Alternative hypothesis H1e requires a subsample of financially constrained firms, 
and we also compare the results for constrained firms with the results for unconstrained 
firms. The results using the SA index are in Table 3.5. There is not much evidence 
supporting H1e for acquisitions. Funds from prior sources of cash are not positively and 
significantly related to acquisitions for either constrained or unconstrained firms.
20
 
Capital expenditures, however, provide some support for the proposition. Lagged 
operating cash flow and lagged divesting are both positively and significantly related to 
capital expenditures only for constrained firms (in model 4). The same is true for lagged 
operating cash flow and R&D—the positive relation exists only for constrained firms 
(model 6). These results show that constrained firms may be using prior cash sources to 
fund future investments in a more systematic way than unconstrained firms do, helping 
explain the larger values of cash within constrained firms. 
                                                 
20
 In untabulated results using Tobit models, there is a positive and significant (p-value=.003) coefficient 
on lagged operating cash flow only for constrained firms, so this does support the alternative hypothesis. 
The coefficient for unconstrained firms is just under zero and insignificant.  
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Table 3.5 
Regressions of Uses of Cash onto Aggregate Lagged Sources for Constrained/Unconstrained Firms. 
All regressions use pooled OLS. Models 1, 3, and 5 contain firm-years in the “least constrained” tercile as defined by the SA Index (Hadlock and Pierce 2010), and the 
other models contain the “most constrained.” All variables are defined in Table A-1 and are scaled by lagged book assets. p-values based on standard errors clustered in 
two dimensions (firm and year) are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Subsample (by SA Index): Unconstr. Constr. Unconstr. Constr. Unconstr. Constr.
Dependent Variable:
Acqui-
sitions
Acqui-
sitions
p -value 
(1=2) CAPX CAPX
p -value 
(3=4) R&D R&D
p -value 
(5=6)
OpCF: contemporaneous 0.103*** 0.031*** 0.00 0.096*** 0.049*** 0.00 0.012 -0.108*** 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.105) (0.000)
OpCF: aggregate lags 1-2 -0.011 0.002 0.07 -0.001 0.020*** 0.00 -0.002 0.073*** 0.00
(0.119) (0.297) (0.895) (0.000) (0.530) (0.000)
Divest (+): contemp. 0.119*** 0 0.00 0.057*** 0.047** 0.69 -0.008 -0.123*** 0.00
(0.000) (0.976) (0.000) (0.023) (0.264) (0.000)
Divest (+): aggregate lags 1-2 -0.019*** 0 0.05 -0.021*** 0.013** 0.00 -0.027*** -0.061** 0.21
(0.007) (0.969) (0.001) (0.031) (0.000) (0.019)
DebtIssue (+): contemp. 0.195*** 0.079*** 0.00 0.045*** 0.072*** 0.00 0.017*** -0.001 0.05
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.928)
DebtIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 -0.066*** -0.024*** 0.00 -0.017*** -0.020*** 0.39 -0.007*** -0.016*** 0.11
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
EqIssue (+): contemp. 0.121*** 0.022*** 0.00 0.085*** 0.043*** 0.01 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.72
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 0.012 0.001 0.28 0.050*** 0.008*** 0.00 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.73
(0.252) (0.516) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dep. Var.: aggregate lags 1-2 0.188*** 0.087*** 0.00 0.428*** 0.260*** 0.00 0.513*** 0.342*** 0.00
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.001 0.001* 0.97 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.07 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.00
(0.404) (0.059) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.007*** -0.006*** 0.015***
(0.847) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N Obs 22,235 16,851 25,428 17,555 14,486 12,356
Adjusted R
2
0.242 0.066 0.573 0.316 0.826 0.714
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Table 3.6 
Regressions of Uses of Cash onto Aggregate Lagged Uses. 
Models 2, 5, and 7 are estimated via Tobit models; all others use pooled OLS. All variables are defined in Table A-1 
and are scaled by lagged book assets. p-values based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) 
are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent Variable:
Acqui-
sitions
Acqui-
sitions CAPX
Stk 
Repurch
Stk 
Repurch
Change in 
Divs
Change in 
Divs R&D
Acquisitions: contemp. 0.019*** -0.008** -0.004 0.001*** 0.006*** 0.052***
(0.000) (0.039) (0.438) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitions: agg. lags 1-2 0.136*** 0.456*** -0.012*** -0.001 0.023*** 0 0.002** -0.024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.957) (0.033) (0.000)
CAPX: contemp. 0.046*** 0.140*** 0.003 0.006 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.080***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.590) (0.555) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPX: agg. lags 1-2 -0.053*** -0.234*** 0.358*** -0.009** -0.021*** -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.067***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stk Repurch: contemp. -0.041** 0.085*** 0.006 0.006*** 0.017*** -0.020*
(0.041) (0.009) (0.589) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062)
Stk Repurch: agg. lags 1-2 0.066*** 0.221*** -0.026*** 0.259*** 0.452*** -0.001 0.007*** -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.291) (0.000) (0.668)
Chg in Divs: contemp. 0.362*** 1.308*** 0.560*** 0.359*** 0.821*** -0.207**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025)
Chg in Divs: agg. lags 1-2 0.253*** 1.135*** 0.212*** 0.247*** 0.648*** 0.053*** 0.353*** -0.080*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057)
R&D: contemp. 0.132*** 0.546*** 0.085*** -0.010* -0.014 -0.002** -0.008**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.336) (0.016) (0.014)
R&D: aggregate lags 1-2 -0.073*** -0.403*** -0.069*** -0.009*** -0.052*** 0 -0.020*** 0.381***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.627) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.001*** 0.001 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.008***
(0.007) (0.256) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.019*** -0.069*** 0.009*** 0.005*** -0.029*** 0 -0.007*** 0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.181) (0.000) (0.026)
N Obs 27,354 27,354 27,354 27,354 27,354 27,354 27,354 27,354
Adjusted R
2
0.046 0.388 0.222 0.024 0.776
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3.4.2 Uses of Cash Linked to Prior Uses 
 We now turn to our second null hypothesis. Table 3.6 contains the results of 
regressions of the same five uses of cash that we have been studying onto 
contemporaneous and aggregate lagged uses of cash. As in the earlier tables, each use of 
cash is positively and significantly related to that same use of cash in the future. This 
leads us to reject the null hypothesis and accept H2a as one alternative. Models 3 and 8 
show that prior acquisitions are negatively related to future capital expenditures and 
R&D, providing support for H2b. In model 1, prior spending on capital expenditures and 
R&D results in less spending on acquisitions in the future. This finding supports H2c. 
Table A-2 in the Appendix contains results using five individual lags of each of the uses 
of cash as explanatory variables. It shows that acquisitions, CAPX, and stock 
repurchases have predictive power for the same use of cash (autocorrelation) five years 
into the future. Table A-3 displays results of logit regressions; the inferences are the 
same as those from Table 3.6. 
3.4.3 Sources of Cash Linked to Prior Sources 
 The final null hypothesis is that future sources of cash have no significant 
relation to the prior sources. Table 3.7 contains OLS regressions of sources of cash onto 
contemporaneous and aggregate lagged sources. Tobit models produce substantially 
similar results and are not reported. Again the null is rejected; all sources of cash have 
positive and statistically significant relations with their respective lagged sources. There 
is also evidence of intertemporal connections among some sources. For example, equity 
issuance in prior years can lead to debt issuance in the next year, but debt issuance has 
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Table 3.7 
Regressions of Sources of Cash onto Aggregate Lagged Sources. 
All regressions use pooled OLS. All variables are defined in Table A-1 and are scaled by lagged book assets. p-values 
based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
  
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable: OpCF Divest DebtIssue EqIssue
OpCF: contemporaneous -0.017*** -0.119*** -0.226***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCF: aggregate lags 1-2 0.289*** 0.004*** 0.077*** -0.058***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Divest (+): contemp. -0.184*** 0.044 -0.084***
(0.000) (0.206) (0.000)
Divest (+): aggregate lags 1-2 0.036*** 0.098*** -0.007 -0.020**
(0.003) (0.000) (0.689) (0.047)
DebtIssue (+): contemp. -0.041*** 0.001 0.011**
(0.000) (0.197) (0.025)
DebtIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 0.026*** 0.006*** 0.323*** 0
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.893)
EqIssue (+): contemp. -0.150*** -0.005*** 0.022**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.043)
EqIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 -0.080*** 0 0.030*** 0.083***
(0.000) (0.748) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.009*** -0.001*** 0.002** 0.027***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000)
Intercept 0.031*** 0.012*** 0.038*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N Obs 66,699 66,699 66,699 66,699
Adjusted R
2
0.498 0.052 0.216 0.236
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no discernible relation with later equity issuance. Firms that divest tend to have higher 
operating cash flow in the future, implying that the remaining assets are more 
productive. The result that lagged equity issuance is negatively related to operating cash 
flow supports the idea that managers may issue stock when they perceive it to be 
overvalued. In contrast, lagged debt issuance is positively related to operating cash flow. 
Table 3.8 contains results from OLS regressions with five lags of each source of 
cash. The findings are similar in nature to those in Table 3.7. All four sources of cash 
have significant and positive relations with all five years of lagged values of itself. This 
table allows us to estimate an implied discount rate that equates the present value of a 
stream of future cash flows with the “extra” value of cash today. Recall from Section 2 
that $1.00 of net positive operating cash flow is valued by investors at $1.40 in the base 
specification (Table 2.6). Model 1 in Table 3.8 shows that one lag of operating cash flow 
has a coefficient of 0.468, and it decreases down to 0.012 at five lags. Consider a firm 
that generates $1.00 of operating cash flow in year t. The coefficients on the lagged cash 
flows imply that investors could expect the dollar realized in year t to result in 47 cents 
of operating cash flow in year t+1, 13 cents in year t+2, and so on. Ignoring all other 
effects of the year t operating cash flow, the implied rate of return that causes these 
uncertain future cash flows to be valued at $0.40 in year t ($1.40 - $1.00) is 47%, a high 
number. If taxes or agency costs were to make the $1.00 of operating cash flow to be 
worth less than $1.00 to investors as predicted in Table 2.2 (ignoring any other effects of 
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Table 3.8 
OLS Regressions of Sources of Cash onto Five Lags of Sources. 
All models use pooled OLS. All variables are defined in Table A-1 and are scaled by lagged book assets. p-values 
based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable: OpCF Divest DebtIssue EqIssue
OpCF: contemporaneous -0.018*** -0.118*** -0.149***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCF: 1 lag(s) 0.468*** -0.004 0.133*** -0.058***
(0.000) (0.187) (0.000) (0.000)
OpCF: 2 lag(s) 0.129*** 0.005** 0.040** -0.006
(0.000) (0.045) (0.012) (0.591)
OpCF: 3 lag(s) 0.048*** 0.006*** -0.007 -0.019**
(0.000) (0.003) (0.516) (0.021)
OpCF: 4 lag(s) 0.028** 0.001 -0.004 -0.01
(0.011) (0.559) (0.539) (0.166)
OpCF: 5 lag(s) 0.012** 0.002 -0.014* 0
(0.032) (0.228) (0.072) (0.999)
Divest (+): contemp. -0.144*** 0.07 -0.041**
(0.000) (0.144) (0.025)
Divest (+): 1 lag(s) 0.051* 0.133*** -0.015 -0.02
(0.080) (0.000) (0.698) (0.242)
Divest (+): 2 lag(s) 0.02 0.060*** -0.037* -0.031**
(0.316) (0.000) (0.086) (0.020)
Divest (+): 3 lag(s) -0.006 0.024*** -0.040* 0.025
(0.475) (0.002) (0.064) (0.127)
Divest (+): 4 lag(s) -0.008 0.016* 0.007 -0.009
(0.500) (0.050) (0.693) (0.425)
Divest (+): 5 lag(s) -0.007 0.018** 0.041* 0.022*
(0.551) (0.023) (0.080) (0.075)
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Table 3.8 Continued 
 
  
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable: OpCF Divest DebtIssue EqIssue
DebtIssue (+): contemp. -0.033*** 0.002 0.019***
(0.000) (0.133) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): 1 lag(s) 0.040*** 0.006*** 0.467*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.872)
DebtIssue (+): 2 lag(s) 0.009** 0.004*** 0.151*** -0.005
(0.027) (0.007) (0.000) (0.349)
DebtIssue (+): 3 lag(s) -0.003 0.003 0.066*** 0.001
(0.602) (0.115) (0.001) (0.883)
DebtIssue (+): 4 lag(s) -0.003 -0.003* 0.033*** 0.001
(0.489) (0.070) (0.005) (0.641)
DebtIssue (+): 5 lag(s) -0.015*** -0.003** 0.038*** -0.004
(0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.199)
EqIssue (+): contemp. -0.119*** -0.004** 0.054***
(0.000) (0.023) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): 1 lag(s) -0.099*** -0.002 0.037** 0.158***
(0.000) (0.366) (0.011) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): 2 lag(s) -0.026* 0.001 -0.001 0.051**
(0.066) (0.778) (0.952) (0.018)
EqIssue (+): 3 lag(s) -0.015 -0.002 -0.016** 0.054***
(0.150) (0.250) (0.038) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): 4 lag(s) 0.005 0 -0.011 0.092***
(0.631) (0.995) (0.147) (0.000)
EqIssue (+): 5 lag(s) 0.004 0 -0.009 0.047***
(0.685) (0.885) (0.338) (0.002)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.011*** -0.001*** 0.003* 0.020***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000)
Intercept 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.175)
N Obs 41,247 41,247 41,247 41,247
Adjusted R
2
0.495 0.059 0.250 0.235
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that dollar), then the implied rate of return would be lower.
21
 
Table A-4 in the Appendix provides details of logit regressions. Some results do 
not carry through into the logit models: lagged divesting and lagged equity issues do not 
relate significantly to the indicator for top-quartile industry operating cash flow. Yet in 
all cases, sources of cash are positively and significantly autocorrelated. In sum, we 
reject the null hypothesis H3, and we accept the alternative hypothesis H3a. Prior 
sources of cash tell investors about likely future sources of cash and thereby provide 
another rationale for shareholders to value cash differently based on its source. 
3.5 Discussion 
Among other questions, the findings of Section 2 raise the question: Why do 
shareholders place such different values on cash from different sources? In this section 
we begin to answer the question by demonstrating that prior sources of cash provide 
shareholders with information about the likely uses of cash in the future. This 
information is impounded into stock prices, providing a link between sources of cash 
and the value of cash. As an example of this mechanism, we find that higher debt 
issuance in the past is associated with lower acquisition activity for the next few years. 
The fact that this connection holds most markedly for firms that appear to be 
overinvesting provides a reason for shareholders to value dollars stemming from debt 
issuance more highly than we might otherwise expect. Another example is the fact that 
                                                 
21
 For example, in a “Taxes Only” world with τ=.10, meaning that $1.00 of operating cash flow would be 
valued at $0.90 by investors (ignoring any other effects), the implied discount rate would then be 15.4% to 
equate the 50-cent disparity ($1.40-$0.90) with the five future operating cash flows. 
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lagged operating cash flows are positively associated with future acquisition activity for 
the firms that appear to benefit most from acquisitions (those in the first investing 
tercile). This connection can result in cash sourced from operating activities having even 
higher values than would be expected otherwise. 
In the same way that past sources provide information about future uses, past 
uses of cash also provide information about future uses. This can result in a relatively 
larger present value effect, where uses of cash that may sometimes not add substantially 
to firm value (such as acquisitions or capital expenditures) may be projected several 
periods into the future, causing firm value to fall further because of the expectation of 
further cash outlays. Finally, past sources of cash also give investors information about 
the future sources and magnitudes of cash that firms may add to the balance sheet in 
future years. For example, for every $1.00 of cash holdings generated by operating cash 
flows, shareholders may look forward to the additional 69 cents that may be generated 
by operating cash flows in the next five years, discounting that value back to the present 
to assign a premium to the single dollar of cash generated today. Together, all three of 
these channels help explain why the value of cash is dependent upon its source. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, we investigate two related facets of the marginal value of 
cash in two essays. In the first essay, we study whether or not the value of cash depends 
on its source or on the direction of the cash (into or out of the firm). We also seek to 
understand if and how financial constraints and distress affect the value of cash across 
the different sources. Finally, we look into the nature of the frictions that may affect the 
values of cash. We find significant differences in the marginal value of cash, depending 
on the source of the cash. Also, increases in cash raise firm value more than 
corresponding decreases in cash lower firm value. Shareholders of firms facing financial 
constraints or distress tend to be more sensitive to any kind of changes in cash as 
opposed to shareholders of less constrained or stronger firms. Agency costs and 
information asymmetry are two frictions that appear to be most prevalent in causing 
deviations in the value of cash from the frictionless scenario. Financially constrained or 
distressed firms seem particularly prone to these frictions. 
 Among other questions raised by the first essay, one of the most pressing is why 
shareholders attribute such different values to marginal cash stemming from different 
sources. We address this question more fully in the second essay. Since the likely use of 
cash affects its value to shareholders, we study how the source of cash today might 
provide information about the likely use of cash in the future. We find statistically and 
economically meaningful relations between lagged sources and future uses of cash, 
providing a rationale for investors to place such different values on cash from different 
sources. Additionally, past uses of cash inform shareholders about likely future uses, and 
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past sources of cash provide information about possible future sources. Some of the 
effects are significant two, three, or even five years into the future. In combination, all of 
the information embedded in cash flows helps explain why an incremental dollar in the 
firm can be worth much more or less than a dollar to shareholders depending on the 
source of that dollar. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLES 
Table A-1 
Variable Definitions. 
All main variables (except AbnRett, and Lt) are first converted to real 2010 dollars. For Section 2, the variables are 
then deflated by the lagged market value of equity, and for Section 3, they are deflated by the lagged book value of 
assets. ∆Xt denotes the 1-year change of variable X from year t-1 to year t (∆Xt = Xt - Xt-1). Corresponding Compustat 
Xpressfeed codes used to calculate each variable are in capital letters after each definition. 
Panel A: Main Variables 
AbnRett or 
Benchmark-
adjusted returns 
( , ,
B
i t i tr R ), the raw annual return of stock i in its fiscal year t less the 
weighted average annual return of its Fama French-25 benchmark portfolio 
during the same year t (assigned based on the intersection of 5 size and 5 
book-to-market quintiles) 
Market Value of 
Equityt 
Common shares outstanding times share price at fiscal year-end 
(CSHO*PRCC_F) 
MktAssetst Market Value of Assets: total assets plus market value of equity less book 
value of equity (AT+CSHO*PRCC_F-(CEQ+TXDITC)) 
Book Value of 
Assetst 
Total assets (AT) 
OpCFt Net cash flow from operating activities (OANCF) 
InvCFNett Net cash flow from investing activities (excluding increases in, sales of, or 
changes in certain financial investments: IVNCF+IVCH–SIV–IVSTCH) 
Investt Gross investing cash flow (uses of cash) (CAPX + AQC – IVACO, where 
IVACO is set to zero if IVACO>0, and missing variables are each treated as 
zero) 
Divestt Divesting cash flow (sources of cash) (SPPE + IVACO, where IVACO is set 
to zero if IVACO<0, and missing variables are each treated as zero) 
FinCFNett Net cash flow from financing activities (FINCF) 
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Table A-1 Continued 
DebtIssuet Long-term debt issuance plus positive realizations of changes in current debt 
(DLTIS+DLCCH, where DLCCH is set to zero if DLCCH<0) 
DebtRetiret Long-term debt reduction less negative realizations of changes in current 
debt (DLTR–DLCCH, where DLCCH is set to zero if DLCCH>0) 
EqIssuet Sale of common and preferred stock (SSTK) 
EqPayoutt Purchase of common and preferred stock plus cash dividends 
(PRSTKC+DV, where missing variables are each treated as zero) 
FinOthert Other financing cash flow plus excess tax benefit of stock options 
(FIAO+TXBCOF, where missing variables are each treated as zero) 
Acquisitions (AQC) 
Capital 
expenditures 
(CAPX) 
Ct Cash and short-term investments (CHE) 
Et Earnings before extraordinary items plus interest expense, deferred taxes, 
and investment tax credits (IB+XINT+TXDI+ITCI) 
NAt Net assets: total assets less cash (AT–CHE) 
RDt Research and development expense (zero if missing, only in Section 2; 
missing observations are not in sample in Section 3) (XRD) 
It Interest expense (zero if missing) (XINT) 
Dt Common dividends (zero if missing) (DVC) 
Lt Market leverage ((DLTT+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+CSHO*PRCC_F)) 
NFt Net financing: sales of stock, less purchases of stock, plus debt proceeds, 
less debt retirements (missing variables are each treated as zero) (SSTK–
PRSTKC+DLTIS–DLTR) 
ATadjt Total assets (AT) 
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Table A-1 Continued 
Panel B: Financial Distress and Financial Constraint Variables: 
2+ Yr Gain/2+ 
Yr Loss 
Firms with positive net operating cash flow for the most recent two years 
are labeled “2+ Yr Gain” and are considered further from distress. Firm with 
negative net operating cash flow for the most recent two years are labeled 
“2+ Yr Loss” and are considered closer to distress. In the first two years of 
the sample, due to sparser population of the net operating cash flow variable 
we use Net Income + Depreciation as a proxy for net operating cash flow if 
OpCF is not available for 2 consecutive years. 
Whited-Wu 
(2006) WW 
Index 
Firms with observations in the top (bottom) tercile of the Whited and Wu 
(2006) structural index each year are considered financially constrained 
(unconstrained). 
Hadlock-Pierce 
(2010) SA Index 
Firms with observations in the top (bottom) tercile of the Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) SA index each year are considered financially constrained 
(unconstrained). 
Payout Ratio The payout ratio is calculated as the sum of total dividends plus stock 
repurchases divided by operating income before depreciation 
((DVC+DVP+PRSTKC)/OIBDP); observations in the top (bottom) tercile 
each year are considered financially unconstrained (constrained); firms with 
nonpositive OIBDP and positive payout are considered unconstrained, and 
firms with nonpositive OIBDP and zero payout are considered constrained. 
Long-term Bond 
Rating 
All firms with positive debt and a long-term credit rating (in Compustat) are 
considered financially unconstrained that year; firms with positive debt and 
no long-term credit rating are deemed to be financially constrained 
(SPLTICRM for credit rating; DLTT+DLC for debt). 
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Table A-2 
OLS Regressions of Uses of Cash onto Five Lags of Uses. 
All models use pooled OLS. All variables are defined in Table A-1 and are scaled by lagged book assets. p-values 
based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent Variable:
Acqui-
sitions CAPX
Stk 
Repurch
Change in 
Divs R&D
Acquisitions: contemp. 0.009** -0.017*** 0.001* 0.058***
(0.016) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000)
Acquisitions: 1 lag(s) 0.132*** 0.01 -0.005 0 -0.051***
(0.000) (0.120) (0.331) (0.730) (0.000)
Acquisitions: 2 lag(s) 0.088*** -0.009** -0.002 0 -0.013***
(0.000) (0.016) (0.638) (1.000) (0.000)
Acquisitions: 3 lag(s) 0.059*** -0.018*** 0.003 -0.001 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.621) (0.127) (0.360)
Acquisitions: 4 lag(s) 0.046*** -0.013*** -0.004 -0.001 -0.003
(0.000) (0.002) (0.312) (0.415) (0.477)
Acquisitions: 5 lag(s) 0.036*** -0.016*** 0.006* 0 -0.009
(0.005) (0.000) (0.071) (0.919) (0.275)
CAPX: contemp. 0.031** -0.002 0.006*** 0.065***
(0.022) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPX: 1 lag(s) -0.040** 0.690*** -0.015 -0.003*** -0.040***
(0.023) (0.000) (0.174) (0.001) (0.000)
CAPX: 2 lag(s) -0.025 0.007 0 -0.002*** -0.031*
(0.107) (0.804) (0.953) (0.008) (0.064)
CAPX: 3 lag(s) -0.028** 0.061*** 0.007 -0.001 0
(0.035) (0.004) (0.477) (0.288) (0.971)
CAPX: 4 lag(s) 0.01 0.059*** -0.005 0 -0.058***
(0.391) (0.000) (0.489) (0.579) (0.004)
CAPX: 5 lag(s) -0.014* 0.026* -0.006 0 -0.011
(0.090) (0.088) (0.328) (0.903) (0.503)
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Table A-2 Continued 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent Variable:
Acqui-
sitions CAPX
Stk 
Repurch
Change in 
Divs R&D
Stk Repurch: contemp. -0.092*** -0.004 0.007*** -0.023***
(0.001) (0.814) (0.000) (0.005)
Stk Repurch: 1 lag(s) 0.127*** -0.01 0.397*** 0 0.003
(0.000) (0.524) (0.000) (0.973) (0.806)
Stk Repurch: 2 lag(s) 0.024 -0.003 0.103*** -0.003 0.003
(0.502) (0.796) (0.000) (0.111) (0.649)
Stk Repurch: 3 lag(s) 0.02 -0.023** 0.047*** -0.001 -0.004
(0.531) (0.048) (0.003) (0.589) (0.686)
Stk Repurch: 4 lag(s) -0.009 -0.029*** 0.030** 0.002*** 0.013
(0.549) (0.000) (0.011) (0.008) (0.220)
Stk Repurch: 5 lag(s) -0.007 -0.021* 0.031** 0 -0.011
(0.656) (0.059) (0.030) (0.807) (0.404)
Chg in Divs: contemp. 0.299* 0.551*** 0.402*** -0.074
(0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.357)
Chg in Divs: 1 lag(s) 0.508*** 0.218*** 0.481*** 0.108*** -0.165***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Chg in Divs: 2 lag(s) 0.149* -0.012 0.064 0.007 -0.039
(0.081) (0.878) (0.170) (0.832) (0.521)
Chg in Divs: 3 lag(s) 0.191* -0.07 0.117** -0.034** -0.131**
(0.063) (0.244) (0.041) (0.046) (0.015)
Chg in Divs: 4 lag(s) 0.197** -0.116 0.119* 0.005 -0.094*
(0.037) (0.139) (0.073) (0.737) (0.095)
Chg in Divs: 5 lag(s) 0.011 0.005 0.022 -0.022 -0.02
(0.897) (0.945) (0.615) (0.243) (0.652)
R&D: contemp. 0.313*** 0.101*** -0.022*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.352)
R&D: 1 lag(s) -0.358*** -0.130*** -0.003 -0.002 0.975***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.709) (0.185) (0.000)
R&D: 2 lag(s) 0.046* -0.005 -0.01 0.002* -0.127**
(0.074) (0.723) (0.202) (0.069) (0.033)
R&D: 3 lag(s) 0.001 0.01 0.007 -0.001* -0.005
(0.981) (0.465) (0.295) (0.089) (0.865)
R&D: 4 lag(s) 0.004 -0.022* 0 0.001** -0.026
(0.831) (0.065) (0.968) (0.019) (0.352)
R&D: 5 lag(s) -0.015 0 -0.006 -0.001** 0.060**
(0.395) (0.960) (0.226) (0.023) (0.011)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.005***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.017*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0 0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.357) (0.002)
N Obs 14,330 14,330 14,330 14,330 14,330
Adj. R
2
0.053 0.491 0.282 0.034 0.849
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Table A-3 
Logit Regressions of Cash Use Indicators onto Aggregate Lagged Uses. 
The dependent variable equals one if the underlying variable is in the top quartile of all observations in the firm’s 3-
digit SIC code. All variables are defined in Table A-1, and all independent variables are scaled by lagged book assets. 
p-values based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent Variable:
1[Acq in 
top 
industry 
quartile]
1[CAPX 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
1[Stk 
Repurch 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
1[∆Divs 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
1[R&D in 
top 
industry 
quartile]
Acquisitions: contemp. 0.673** 0.001 1.719*** 4.198***
(0.018) (0.999) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisitions: aggregate lags 1-2 6.681*** -1.468*** 0.855*** 1.155*** -1.607***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008)
CAPX: contemp. 1.707*** 0.57 2.361*** 7.986***
(0.000) (0.212) (0.000) (0.000)
CAPX: aggregate lags 1-2 -3.102*** 15.387*** -0.795* -0.848** -3.861***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.053) (0.026) (0.000)
Stk Repurch: contemp. 2.743*** 1.016 4.117*** 0.413
(0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.648)
Stk Repurch: aggregate lags 1-2 2.654*** -1.021** 17.700*** 2.022*** -0.474
(0.000) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.426)
Chg in Divs: contemp. 19.662*** 29.037*** 40.917*** -0.256
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.978)
Chg in Divs: aggregate lags 1-2 14.924*** 16.801*** 31.966***132.890*** 0.108
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.982)
R&D: contemp. 6.663*** 8.784*** 0.31 -2.222***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.566) (0.003)
R&D: aggregate lags 1-2 -5.346*** -6.510*** -2.129*** -5.284*** 22.930***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.041*** 0.244*** 0.084*** 0.089*** 0.276***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept -1.158*** -3.746*** -1.311*** -1.386*** -6.341***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N Obs 27,354 27,354 27,354 27,354 27,354
Pseudo R
2
0.092 0.280 0.150 0.145 0.669
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Table A-4 
Logit Regressions of Cash Source Indicators onto Aggregate Lagged Sources. 
The dependent variable equals one if the underlying variable is in the top quartile of all observations in the firm’s 3-
digit SIC code. All variables are defined in Table A-1, and all independent variables are scaled by lagged book assets. 
p-values based on standard errors clustered in two dimensions (firm and year) are in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
1 2 3 4
Dependent Variable:
1[OpCF in 
top 
industry 
quartile]
1[Divest 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
1[Debt-
Issue in 
top 
industry 
quartile]
1[EqIssue 
in top 
industry 
quartile]
OpCF: contemporaneous -0.413*** -2.230*** -0.541*
(0.006) (0.000) (0.067)
OpCF: aggregate lags 1-2 7.024*** 0.302*** 1.235*** -0.773***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Divest (+): contemp. -2.892*** 0.131 -1.428***
(0.000) (0.755) (0.004)
Divest (+): aggregate lags 1-2 -0.218 7.533*** 0.249 -0.707***
(0.373) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): contemp. -0.011 0.198*** 0.603***
(0.897) (0.005) (0.000)
DebtIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 0.120** 0.334*** 3.265*** -0.241***
(0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
EqIssue (+): contemp. 0.272 -0.473*** -0.168
(0.115) (0.000) (0.204)
EqIssue (+): aggregate lags 1-2 0.076 -0.225* 0.379*** 1.606***
(0.668) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged Mkt/Book Assets 0.436*** -0.225*** -0.008 0.523***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.575) (0.000)
Intercept -2.973*** -0.934*** -1.796*** -2.289***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N Obs 66,699 66,699 66,699 66,699
Pseudo R
2
0.220 0.055 0.116 0.136
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